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Introduction 
 Unigov is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in Indianapolis and 
Indiana history. In the often times hostile environment of Indiana politics it is nothing 
short of a miracle that the leaders in the Republican Party were able to get the Unigov bill 
approved and have it be as successful for the city as it has been. Unigov also created a 
modern day political machine for the Republican Party of Indianapolis. The new city of 
Indianapolis under the leadership of Republican Mayors Richard Lugar and William 
Hudnut has earned national name recognition on the convention circuit and for hosting 
amateur athletics events. Over time the growth attributed to Unigov has proven to be 
unsustainable. Unigov has also been inefficient at solving many of the social problems 
the city had when it was created. 
 Unigov and the initial growth of the city from its consolidation were dependent on 
the suburban tax base that used to exist in the outer townships of Marion County. Unigov 
has had the effect of pushing that tax base even further out from the central business 
district. Many of the problems Indianapolis faces today were the same problems it faced 
when Unigov expanded the city. This has had the effect of building a new city on old 
problems. As the suburbs have expanded they now compete directly with Indianapolis for 
jobs, entertainment, and cultural events. The goal of this paper is to better understand the 
need for Unigov, how it fits into a national context, and how the city has fared over the 
first twenty-two years since its enactment. 
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Chapter 1 City Living Patterns Begin to Change 
Origins of Urban Sprawl 
 The unplanned outward growth of a city has come to be known by the term urban 
sprawl. It is one of the most complex problems for an American city. In the 1920s Robert 
E. Park (1864–1944) and Ernest W. Burgess (1886–1966) at the University of Chicago 
developed what are now commonly held theories on urban ecology which proposed that 
cities were environments like those found in nature. Park and Burgess proposed the idea 
that scarce urban resources, such as land, led to competition between groups and 
ultimately to the division of the urban space into distinctive ecological niches or "natural 
areas" in which people shared similar social characteristics because they were subject to 
the same ecological pressures.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Nina Brown. "CSISS Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925." CSISS 
Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925. January 1, 2011. Accessed 
December 14, 2014. http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/26. 
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The Concentric Zone Theory 
Five zones of concentric zone theory2 
Their model, known as the concentric zone theory and first published in The 
City (1925), predicted that cities would take the form of five concentric rings with areas 
of social and physical deterioration concentrated near the city center and more prosperous 
areas located near the city's edge. These outer areas would eventually become known as 
the suburbs.3 The mass production of automobiles allowed working and middle class, 
predominately white, Americans to move farther and farther away from their places of 
work or the train depots that ran into the city, creating sprawl. Between 1920 and 1930, 
automobile registration rose by more than 150 percent and the suburbs of the nation’s 
                                                          
2 "Concentric Zones." Crime and Place. Accessed December 15, 2014. 
http://crimeandplaceashleypick.weebly.com/concentric-zones.html.  
3 Nina Brown. "CSISS Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925." CSISS 
Classics - Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925. January 1, 2011. Accessed 
December 14, 2014. http://www.csiss.org/classics/content/26. 
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ninety-six largest cities grew twice as fast as the core communities. The automobile made 
it infinitely easier to commute in directions perpendicular to the trolley tracks and the 
truck became a marvel of efficiency as it changed the way people lived and worked. With 
the ease and cheapness of moving people in and out of the center city, workers fanned out 
in the metropolis, while factories crowded near the rail heads.4 
As the automobile suburbs began to emerge they had noticeable characteristics 
such as lower population density and larger average lot sizes as compared to anything 
previously seen in an American urban setting. Lot sizes increased from about three 
thousand square feet to five thousand square feet. The idea of an American city with 
densely populated urban centers of people, industries, stores, and offices had become a 
nineteenth century phenomenon. In conjunction with cheap fuel and mass produced 
vehicles, the urban expressways were another way of lowering the marginal 
transportation costs and greatly stimulated further expansion from the central business 
district. This appeal of low-density living over time and across regional, class, and ethnic 
groups has been so powerful that some have even begun to think of it as inevitable. This 
appeal was even stronger when one considers the financial incentive of detached home 
living provided by the deduction of mortgage interest and real estate taxes from gross 
income.5 
                                                          
4 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 175,183-184. 
5 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 184-185, 188, 191. 
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New subdivisions that developed after World War II shared common attributes, 
including a peripheral location, low density, and the design of the neighborhoods based 
on the idea that everyone would have an automobile. If suburban residents did not have a 
vehicle, they would face a major handicap in accessing jobs and shopping facilities. 
Another characteristic of these new suburban housing developments was their easy 
financial availability. Due to mass-production techniques, government financing, higher 
wages, and a low interest rate, it was much cheaper to buy new housing in the suburbs 
than it was to reinvest in central city properties or to even rent at market prices.6 
As the middle-class left the central city, the central city became more isolated 
from middle-class society. These neighborhoods have become dominated by joblessness, 
racial segregation and were further separated from the private economy. Children were 
deprived of local successful role models and connections to opportunity inside or outside 
the neighborhood. A society emerged with expectations and patterns of behavior that 
contrasted strongly with middle-class norms. As poverty concentrated and social 
disorganization increased, crime grew, and waves of middle-class flight, business 
disinvestment, and property values surrounding the core continued to decline.7 
                                                          
6 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 238-241. 
7 Orfield, Myron. "Portland Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for Community and Stability." July 1, 
1998, 4-7. Accessed February 13, 2015. 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFA
QFjAHOAo&url=https://clfuture.org/sites/clfuture.org/files/pdfs/clf_publications/portland_metropolitics_
report.pdf&ei=lprdVISiF9jpoATmqoHQBA&usg=AFQj. 
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Racial discrimination is another problem stemming from before the United States 
emerged as an independent nation; this has led to an extremely limited amount of land for 
black Americans in the city and the suburbs. The federal government created a direct 
impact on the racial make-up of communities by allowing discrimination to become 
institutionalized in the United States’ housing markets. This happened under the New 
Deal when the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created to help struggling 
families meet mortgage payments. This was done by offering low interest, long-term 
mortgage loans. In doing this the HOLC developed a ratings system to evaluate the risk 
associated with loans made to specific urban neighborhoods. These became known as 
residential security maps. On these maps the highest risk areas were colored red and were 
“red-lined;” even those with small black percentages were rated as “hazardous,” and 
residents were denied loans. During the 1930s and 1940s, HOLC residential security 
maps were widely used by private banks for their own loan practices.8  
This had the effect of institutionalizing common discriminatory banking practices 
and increased the difficulty for black Americans to own their home. Lack of home 
ownership has forced black Americans to rent and the tenant will gain no equity. When 
the apartment building fell into disrepair and lowered its own and neighboring property 
value, the local schools suffered from the lower tax revenues. These practices created a 
                                                          
8 David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs: Third Edition a 2000 Census Update, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2003), 1,24. 
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demoralizing effect on the communities they impacted and reinforced negative 
stereotypes for communities who had never suffered from such discrimination.  
The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act, that created the interstate freeway system, 
has provided the opportunity for residents to live in suburbs even further away from the 
center city. Indianapolis for instance, now has Interstate 465 that runs for approximately 
fifty-two miles around the outer edge of Marion County. The original Indianapolis ring 
road was Kessler Boulevard which was built in 1920 and had been designed to get people 
to the east and west of Indianapolis. However, Kessler Boulevard only runs for a 
combined length of twelve miles.9 The Interstate Highway system has made it possible 
for people to commute to work from longer distances and created a fact that interurban 
transportation (between cities) was better than intraurban transportation (within cities).10 
This increased the distance a metropolitan statistical area now covers and has made it 
nearly impossible for traditional forms of local government to control the problems 
caused and exacerbated by urban sprawl. 
 
                                                          
9 Sharon Freeland. "HI Mailbag: Origin of the Name of Kessler Boulevard." Historic Indianapolis All 
Things Indianapolis History RSS. December 31, 2013. Accessed December 14, 2014. 
http://historicindianapolis.com/hi-mailbag-origin-of-the-naming-of-kessler-boulevard/. 
10 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 184-185, 188, 191. 
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Interstate 465 
Map of present day Indianapolis11 
 
 
                                                          
11 "Google Maps." Google Maps. Accessed December 15, 2014. 
https://www.google.com/maps/@39.8132577,-86.2110254,12z. 
12 
 
Kessler Boulevard 
Kessler Boulevard is highlighted.12 
 
                                                          
12 "Google Maps." Google Maps. Accessed December 15, 2014. 
https://www.google.com/maps/dir/39.8555512,-
86.0841166/1650+W+Kessler+Blvd+N+Dr,+Indianapolis,+IN+46222/@39.8068968,-
86.2248967,12z/data=!4m9!4m8!1m0!1m5!1m1!1s0x886b57067952f211:0x71257763ddcddb52!2m2!1d-
86.2110625!2d39.7884985!5i2. 
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Indianapolis and Portland Combatting Urban Sprawl 
 The Indianapolis and Portland experiences with urban sprawl have occurred 
during roughly the same time period but they each came up with far different solutions. 
Before the enactment of Unigov in 1970, the Indianapolis city limits were eighty-two 
square miles, roughly the same area as its Center Township. After the passage of Unigov, 
the city would expand to 402 square miles.13 The 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act had led 
to an explosion of highway construction in the 1950s and 1960s to link seven major 
national highways at Indianapolis. This created a lot of expansion and growth in the 
Indianapolis area. Housing developments north of the city in Washington Township were 
some of the first to appear. They were moderately priced subdivisions that sold houses to 
new residents and emigrants from the inner city.14 These subdivisions were then followed 
in the mid-1960s by a large influx of suburban apartment complexes that would end up 
surrounding the periphery of the pre-Unigov city.15 
 With construction of the 1950s and 1960s, Marion County population rose from 
697,567 in 1960 to 785,085 in 1970.16 Most of this growth, however, was outside of the 
city limits as the Center Township’s population dropped from 333,351 in 1960 to 
273,598 in 1970.17 The surge in population to the suburban townships did not stop at the 
                                                          
13 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1353. 
14 Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Politics of Metropolitanization: City-County Consolidation in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, 1971. (Retrieved from Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University), 9. 
15 Ibid., 10. 
16 Ibid., 10-11. 
17 "The Official Website of the City of Indianapolis and Marion County." Population Change (2000-2010). 
Accessed February 9, 2015. 
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county line. Hamilton and Johnson Counties gained 13,758 and 17,067 residents, 
respectively, over the same ten year period. This equaled a thirty-three percent increase in 
population for Hamilton County and a forty percent increase for Johnson County.18 
Indianapolis, specifically Center Township, continued the trend of a decreasing 
population and during the 1970s lost 65,000 residents as nearly twenty percent of the 
population moved.19 The out-migration of the higher- and middle-class residents 
produced a district that was not focused on education. This created a loss of tax revenue 
and a significant loss in local civic leadership. The affluent were the first to leave in a 
large human migration known as “white flight,” mostly because they had the means and 
the ability to leave more than anyone else. This division of society created an inner city 
with few examples or connections to middle class society. 
 The signs of downtown Indianapolis’ demise had been slowly adding up. 
Downtown Indianapolis in the early 1960s had become a place for only work and 
government. There were no cultural attractions and most businesses closed between 5:00 
p.m. and 6:00 p.m. The trash in the central canal and the abandoned meat packing plants 
along the White River produced a foul odor that kept people away from downtown. 
Pigeons even became such a problem that until 1970 the city was paying four men to 
                                                          
http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/DMD/Planning/Stats/Census/Pages/population.aspx. 
18 Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Politics of Metropolitanization: City-County Consolidation in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, 1971. (Retrieved from Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University), 11. 
19 William Hudnut III, The Hudnut Years in Indianapolis, 1976-1991, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 201. 
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shoot pigeons every Sunday.20 These four men would average over 400 pigeons per 
Sunday but families, especially with small children, were displeased with this method. 
 The Indianapolis Republican party in the 1960s was also going through a changing 
of the guard, with a number of new young professionals ready to improve the city and 
develop a national reputation. Mayors of Indianapolis after World War II were focused 
on reversing the effects of suburbanization which was diminishing the city’s tax base but 
were keen on accomplishing this without federal assistance. A tradition of a part-time 
mayor was strong in the city. For example, in the early 1960s the Indianapolis mayor was 
paid $12,000 to manage a government serving over 500,000 people.21  
Mayor Richard Lugar 
Richard Lugar was one of these young professionals who realized Indianapolis 
was going to need more than a part-time mayor. Lugar would eventually become the 
mayor (1968-1976) and a United States senator from Indiana (1977-2013). Richard Lugar 
got his start in politics by winning a seat for the 1964 Indianapolis School Board of 
Commissioners. Soon into the campaign Lugar quickly become known as the “silver 
tongued orator.”22 He is a fifth generation Hoosier and graduated in 1950 from Shortridge 
High School. In 1954 he graduated from Denison University in Granville, Ohio where he 
                                                          
20 Ted Green, "Naptown to Super City : How a Civics-Sports Strategy Transformed Indianapolis," 
PBS, http://video.wfyi.org/video/2282207842/. 
21 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 935-936.  
22 Emma Lou Thornbrough, 1993. The Indianapolis story: school segregation and desegregation in a 
northern city. (Manuscript)(Indiana Historical Society, 1994), 184. 
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was co-president of the student government with his future wife Charlene Smeltzer. He 
was also a member of Phi Beta Kappa fraternity.23 Afterwards Lugar attended Pembroke 
College at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar where he received a second bachelor's 
degree and a master's degree in 1956.24 
When Lugar ran for mayor he was only 35 years old; he had previously been a 
former vice president of Community Action Against Poverty (CAAP), and executive at 
Thomas I. Green and Co. In the Republican Primary, Lugar defeated Alex M. Clark, a 
former mayor of Indianapolis. This was due in part to Lugar’s association with the 
Republican Action Committee (RAC) which was a group of young Republicans who 
formed after the major defeats in the 1964 election. They wanted to take control of the 
Republican Party. Lugar gave nearly 400 speeches and was able to defeat Mayor John 
Barton with 72,278 votes to 63,284 votes.25 Republicans also won a six-to-three majority 
on the City Council which was attributed to a low turnout for Democrats in Center 
Township and the good organization of the RAC. This helped set the stage for the 
passage of Unigov two years later in 1969.26 The old city of Indianapolis boundaries was 
essentially Center Township. 
                                                          
23 Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne 
Publishing, 2006), 112. 
24 "Richard G. Lugar, United States Senator for Indiana - Press Releases." July 30, 2008. Accessed 
November 23, 2014. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080730212313/http:/lugar.senate.gov/bio/extended.cfm. 
25 Ibid., 537. 
26 Ibid., 538. 
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 After Lugar won the 1967 mayoral election he made his inaugural address on 
Sunday, January 7th 1968 at Butler University’s Clowes Hall to around 1,700 supporters. 
He spoke of his disappointing tenure on the Indianapolis School Board where he felt his 
progressive views on school integration cost him leadership of the board. “As a School 
Board member, I fought for the concept that we must gear our plans and polices to meet 
the total needs of the community; in due course, my effectiveness was terminated and I 
was exiled to a point out of mind if not out of sight,” stated Lugar.27 
 The election of Lugar was a turning point in Indianapolis politics. Before Lugar’s 
nomination, in the 1963 election Democrats won the mayor’s office with Barton and they 
also won a City Council majority, and in 1964 they won control of the governorship, both 
houses of the Indiana General Assembly, and the Marion County legislative delegation. 
With Democratic control throughout the Indiana and the Indianapolis government, 
Democrats decided to reform the Indianapolis government structure. Bills were 
introduced in the state legislature which aimed to give the mayor’s office broad powers of 
appointment and removal. These moves were unpopular from the start and were dubbed a 
“power grab” by the Indianapolis News editor M. Stanton Evans; the term stuck and was 
partly responsible for the reform movement’s defeat.28 
                                                          
27 Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne 
Publishing, 2006), 114. 
28 Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 10-11. 
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 Most of the bills sent to the state legislature were not sponsored by Mayor Barton 
but by Jim Beatty, the Marion County Democratic chairman. When it became evident 
that the bills would not pass, Mayor Barton and Governor Roger Branigan (D) became 
reluctant to mention the issue. Beatty’s changes to Indianapolis government involved 
only existing administrative agencies and they would not have altered any jurisdictions. 
These proposals were also met with harsh criticism from the public and media, which 
was clearly noticed by members of the Republican Party.29 Beatty tried to unseat Mayor 
Barton in the primary; he was unsuccessful but did enough to split the Democratic Party 
so that in the general election Lugar was able to unseat the incumbent mayor.30 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 112. 
30 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 537.  
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Marion County Nine Township map.31 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 "Township Maps, 2010." Township Maps: STATS Indiana. Accessed December 15, 2014. 
http://www.stats.indiana.edu/maptools/townships.asp. 
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Republican Action Party and Unigov 
With the 1968 elections, the Republican Party was back in power in Indiana. 
There was now a Republican governor, Edgar Whitcomb, and two-to-one majorities in 
both houses of the Indiana General Assembly. These victories were key to the passage of 
Unigov. This was part of a plan that had been hatched following the beating Republicans 
sustained in Indianapolis following the 1964 election. The RAC successfully challenged 
the party organization in the 1966 primary election when L. Keith Bulen, a prosperous 
attorney, became the Marion County Republican chairman.32 The RAC provided support 
in the nomination of Governor Whitcomb, and Mayor Lugar also hit the campaign trail 
throughout the state for Republican legislative candidates.33  
Prior to November, 1968, discussions about Unigov were among a small group of 
people but with the political victories of 1968, Unigov started to look like a possibility. 
The process for passing Unigov was a rapid one, with coordinated action from the 
legislature which was set to convene in January, because the 1969 session was only set to 
last for 61 days. This gave the impression to the casual observer that Unigov appeared in 
November and was passed into law by March.34 
 The municipal government structure when Mayor Lugar was elected in 1967 had a 
nine-member city council, known as the Common Council. Members were elected at 
                                                          
32 Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 13-14. 
33 Ibid., 14. 
34 Ibid., 17-18. 
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four-year intervals by a hybrid district/at-large system. The two major parties would each 
field six council candidates, one for each of the city’s six council districts. These twelve 
candidates would appear on an at-large ballot and the top nine vote earners would then 
constitute the new Common Council.35 This system ensured each party would get at least 
three council seats, and procedures adopted informally would also ensure the election of 
at least one black council member. The mayor was also elected to four year terms and 
held appointment and veto powers. 
 Unigov came to life though the RAC which put together the basis for the bill well 
before any plans were released to the public. Key members of the RAC included Lugar as 
well as Marion County Council president Beurt SerVaas, Indianapolis Common Council 
president Thomas C. Hasbrook, Marion County Republican Party chairman Bulen, State 
Representatives Larry Borst and John Mutz, RAC chairman John Burkhardt, and 
Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce executive vice-president Carl Dortch. This 
committee met throughout 1968, most often in Burkhardt’s home, to discuss the pros and 
cons of city-county consolidation and strategies for adoption.36  
SerVass even went so far as to raise funds and secure attorney Lewis C. Bose to 
compose a memorandum exploring the legal dimensions of metropolitan consolidation. 
Bose pointed out to the group that Indiana did not have a tradition of local home rule, 
meaning that the state had complete legal authority over local government structure and 
                                                          
35 Ibid., 1350. 
36 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1350. 
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powers. He noted that consolidation could be passed by the General Assembly without an 
amendment to the Indiana Constitution or a public referendum.37 Bose headed the legal 
task force for which at least eight men were needed in preparing the 162 page proposal.38 
During the quiet private meetings at the Burkhart home many ideas and problems 
were discussed that would be associated with a consolidated government. SerVass, 
Lugar, Burkhart, and Borst were strongly for the efficiencies of a consolidated 
government. The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce was also on board. At first it was 
William Book, and then in 1968 it became Dortch, advancing programs to eliminate 
duplication and inefficiency in government.39 At the same time the RAC remembered the 
1965 Democratic attempt to expand the power of the city and its mayor over Marion 
County without expanding the vote countywide. Borst credited SerVass for coming up 
with the name “Unigov.”40  
 After large scale victories in the 1968 local and state elections, the Republican 
Party controlled the Indianapolis mayor’s office, the Indianapolis City Council, the 
Marion County Council, the Marion County delegation to the Indiana General Assembly, 
both houses of the General Assembly, and the governor’s office. Republicans held 
seventy-three seats in the one hundred seat State House of Representatives and thirty-five 
of fifty seats in the Senate. This included all eight state senators and 15 state 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 1350. 
38 Stanley Landfair, "An Evaluation of Unigov", (Senior Thesis) Butler University, 1975), 16. 
39 Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne 
Publishing, 2006), 118-119. 
40 Lawrence Borst, Gentlemen, It’s Been My Pleasure: Four Decades in the Indiana Legislature. (Guild 
Press Emmis Books, 2003), 84. 
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representatives from Marion County.41 These victories created a political climate that 
allowed for Unigov to be passed quickly and with little debate. Before the 1968 election 
Lugar created a forty member Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC) 
Governmental Reorganization Task Force to further and refine the consolidation strategy. 
The GIPC was a private, not-for-profit, non-partisan civic improvement organization 
funded by foundation grants and private contributions. It was created under Mayor 
Barton in 1964 to function as an advisory arm of the mayor’s office and continues to 
operate today.42 
 On September 4th, 1968 Mayor Lugar went public with the first step of 
consolidating the government by focusing on combining the data processing and possibly 
employee fringe benefits for the city and county employees. Lugar arranged a meeting 
with SerVass, chairman of the Marion County Council, and Hasbrook, who chaired the 
City Council. An agreement was put into place for a committee to study how combining 
these functions of government might work. The media understood this to mean that a 
government consolidation bill would be prepared for the 1969 session of the Indiana 
General Assembly.43  
The next step in creating Unigov was creating the Governmental Reorganization 
Task Force. This task force was created by Mayor Lugar and co-chaired by SerVass and 
                                                          
41 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1351. 
42 Ibid., 639. 
43 Stanley Huseland, Political Warrior: The Life And Times of L. Keith Bulen. (Carmel: Hawthorne 
Publishing, 2006), 118-119. 
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Hasbrook. There were around thirty people with diverse backgrounds charged with going 
public with the Unigov concept. The goal was to get lots of points of view and hear any 
concerns so a more detailed plan could be created. The RAC was also able to get more 
talented people to donate their time such as lawyer Charles Whister, who was one of 
many to research existing laws and study the technical issues of special taxing districts.44 
Following the vetting and discussion by the SerVaas-Hasbrook committee, it came 
time to sell the benefits of consolidated government to the broader community. Lugar 
took the lead: “I took advantage of that situation because people had become interested in 
Indianapolis. I was on television every night; I was giving reports to the people. I 
addressed Lincoln Days around the state, and began to meet with Republicans that I knew 
were going to be a part of the General Assembly. I am sure Keith (Bulen) was doing the 
same thing, although we did not coordinate our efforts.”45 
The final step in the process of getting Unigov passed into law was drafting the 
bill and having it voted on in the General Assembly. Since Indianapolis did not have 
home rule, a referendum was not needed to change the structure of Indianapolis 
government. In 1968 Borst won a seat in the Senate of the Indiana General Assembly. 
Lugar’s legislative team thought it best that the Unigov bill should start in the Senate 
with Borst introducing it as the principal author. Unigov became Senate Bill 543 and on 
February 15, 1968, it passed with the minimum constitutional majority, twenty-six-to-
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eighteen. The bill was then sent to State Representative Henry E. Lamkin Jr., chairman of 
the committee on affairs of Marion County, in the House of Representatives, where he 
was to help the bill on its way.46 
Lamkin was able to move the bill out of his Republican-controlled committee and 
onto the House calendar. Republicans did face some Democratic opposition and had to 
vote down restrictive amendments at the second reading stage. One of these amendments 
would have required a referendum. SB 543 moved to the third reading calendar to await 
the call of Speaker Otis Bowen for a vote on the final passage in the House.47 This proved 
to be the most difficult part of the process of passing Unigov because of a poor decision 
by Mayor Lugar. 
Lamkin, who was in communication with Mayor Lugar, was worried that Bowen 
was holding the Unigov bill too long on the second reading calendar and feared Bowen 
had intent to kill the bill. This fear came from the fact that the RAC had run a candidate 
against Bowen for speaker of the house in 1966.48 Lugar responded to Larkin’s concern 
by asking for Bowen’s private phone number. Lugar then went on and called a press 
conference and asked the public to use Bowen’s telephone number to urge him to pass 
Unigov. This had the effect of driving Bowen away, and Bowen’s staff reported they 
received more negative than positive calls about Unigov.49 
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The press conference that Lugar had called took place on a Friday and by 
Saturday, February 21st and 22nd respectively, Lugar had sent a note of apology to 
Bowen. Part of the letter was excerpted in the Sunday issue of the Indianapolis Star in 
which Lugar stated: “As I watched your interview on TV last evening, I realized I had 
been misinformed about the mechanics of calling down bills for consideration. I believe 
you were quite correct in calling House-originated bills first, and your point that Unigov 
was barely 12 hours past second reading was well taken.”50 Bowen felt no apology was 
required and realized that the Unigov supporters wanted the bill moved to the front of the 
line, but Bowen would make no special accommodations for the bill. When Bowen 
finally handed down SB 543, it passed sixty-six to twenty-nine, following a largely 
partisan vote.51  
 The reason why Speaker Bowen did not need Lugar to apologize was because the 
RAC was willing to support Bowen on two of his initiatives. The first was his desire for a 
general tax increase to raise state revenues which Governor Whitcomb was firmly 
against. The other initiative was in support of Speaker Bowen’s desire to become 
Governor, which he did, serving from 1973 until 1981.52 
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Portland Political Structural Changes 
 Portland, Oregon since the 1970s has been a leader in combatting urban sprawl. It 
has used federal funds to build a public transit system that has supported its downtown. 
The city has worked with the state to not subsidize suburban housing developments. The 
residents and leaders of Portland value sustainable growth. Portland since the 1970s has 
been the national leader in urban planning and is the prime example for all American 
cities to immolate. Portland has even changed its political structure to better govern its 
growing city. 
Compared to Portland, Oregon in 1970, Indianapolis was about the same size in 
area. Portland in 1970 was eighty-nine square miles, contained 382,619 residents, and 
was the thirty-fifth largest city in the nation. Indianapolis had a population of 744,624 in 
1970, with a population density per square mile of 1,963 residents, whereas Portland’s 
population density was 4,294.53 Between 1970 and 2000 the metropolitan area of 
Portland grew by one million people. There has been some cause for concern for Portland 
since the 1970s; notably, married family households have declined in both absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of households within Portland. Several inner city 
neighborhoods have seen a decline in the percentage of families with school-aged 
children as well as a decline in the overall median age of residents between 1990 and 
                                                          
53 Gibson, Campbell. "POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST CITIES AND OTHER URBAN PLACES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1790 TO 1990." U.S. Census Bureau. June 1, 1998. Accessed January 31, 2015. 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab20.txt. 
28 
 
2000.54 Married families with children were also the residents that Indianapolis has 
wanted to attract back to its downtown as well. 
Portland’s political structure began to change in the late 1950s with the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission (1957-1966), which undertook data inventory and 
studies of economic and land-use conditions. In 1966, the organization evolved into 
the Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG, 1966-1978), and was a 
regional planning agency. CRAG met the federal requirements for transportation, 
housing, and sanitation planning to be coordinated on a regional basis before federal 
funds could be allocated to improve infrastructure. From 1966 to 1974, local 
governments could choose whether or not to be part of CRAG; participation was 
mandated by legislative action from 1974 to 1978. In May of 1978 CRAG was voted to 
be merged with the Metropolitan Service District, MSD (1970-1978), which was 
responsible for solid-waste planning. Shortly after the approval by voters, the agency's 
governing body changed the official name to Metro. Metro serves the urbanized areas of 
Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington Counties. Since January 1979, Metro has 
remained the only directly elected regional government for any United States 
metropolitan area. 
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Metro’s Organizational Family Tree.55  
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Portland, Oregon Metropolitan Statistical Area Map 
(Interstate 405 runs through downtown Portland) 
Map of Portland-Vancouver MSA.56 
 Originally, Metro had a directly elected executive officer and a twelve member 
council. The district boundaries were drawn to cross city and county boundaries, so that 
councilors would see themselves as direct representatives of the citizens rather than as 
agents of pre-existing units of local government (analogous to members of the state 
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legislature). In 1992, voters adopted a home-rule charter for Metro that reduced the 
number of councilors to seven and created an independently elected auditor. The most 
recent structural change to Metro came with charter amendments that went into effect in 
2003. The new arrangement abandoned the separation of powers model for something 
analogous to a mayor-council system. The council consisted of six members elected from 
districts and a council president elected at large. The council president set agendas and 
made appointments to all Metro committees, board, and commissions. Metro was 
responsible for the planning of land-use, transportation, open space, solid waste and 
disposal, the Oregon Zoo, and the convention and performance venues. 
Portland also received support from Oregon’s Republican Governor Tom McCall 
(1967-1975), who proposed legislation that required local governments to complete 
comprehensive zoning plans. This would provide Portland the resources to enforce local 
land planning measures. In 1973, land-use planning again became a major issue and 
ended up surviving three different statewide referendums. The final bill did not go as far 
as McCall originally intended; a compromise bill forged by L.B. Day, McCall’s head of 
the Department of Environmental Quality, created the Land Conservation and 
Development Commission.57 
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Urban Growth Boundary 
The 1973 establishment of a mandatory planning program administered by a state 
Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), required every Oregon city 
and county to prepare a comprehensive plan that responded to a set of statewide goals 
and thus had created a system of strong local planning carried on within enforceable state 
guidelines that express a vision of the public interest. This also provided the legal basis 
for Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) that was established in 1979.58 Oregon’s 
land-use system and UGBs were an attempt to make development choices intentional and 
public rather than bit-by-bit which was favored by private companies.59 The “Portland 
Revolution” of the 1970s was in full gear.  
The UGB in 1979 was thought to have encompassed a twenty-year supply of 
developable land when it decided on its 369 square mile area. Outlying areas have their 
own UGBs and the intent is to prevent sprawl by providing for “an orderly and efficient 
transition from rural to urban use.”60 Therefore, a burden rests on any developer wishing 
to use land outside the boundary to prove that it is of little value as resource land or farm 
land and that adequate land inside the UGB does not exist. By limiting speculative 
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development of large distant residential tracts, the LDC system has discouraged the 
emergence of “super developers” with overwhelming political clout.61  
The Unconsolidated Unigov 
 In Indianapolis consolidation was also partially seen as a loss of local control and 
independence. Due to this there was intense local opposition to expanding the 
consolidation of other local government functions; the eleven school districts in Marion 
County were not consolidated, nor was the city fire department with the township fire 
departments, or the city police with the county sheriff. The township system of providing 
poor relief was also left intact. The incorporated cities of Beech Grove, Lawrence, 
Southport, and the town of Speedway would not be absorbed into the new municipal 
government because one municipality cannot annex property within another municipality 
without consent, regardless of the size of either municipality.62 However, since these 
residents paid county taxes they would be allowed to vote for the county-wide executive 
and council.63  
The county offices of auditor, clerk, coroner, prosecutor, recorder, sheriff, 
surveyor, and treasurer would not be changed in any way since doing so would require an 
amendment to the Indiana Constitution. Six of the sixteen independent municipal 
corporations providing local government services within Marion County would remain 
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independent. These were the Capital Improvement Board, the City-County Building 
Authority, the Health and Hospital Corporation, the Indianapolis Airport Authority, the 
Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation, and the Indianapolis-Marion County 
Public Library.64   
 Before being passed by the state legislature, Unigov faced multiple sources of 
opposition. The Democrats objected to the obvious partisan advantage to be gained by the 
Republicans in shifting the electoral base of Indianapolis government from the city to the 
county. Black residents of Indianapolis were fearful of losing the small political influence 
they had before the addition of 250,000 mostly white residents from the county. Public 
officials and residents of nearby communities were also worried that Indianapolis might 
one day expand past the county line. A “Minigov” amendment had a provision in it that 
blocked the new Consolidated City of Indianapolis from annexing territory outside 
Marion County. This amendment deflected concerns of suburban Republicans and kept 
them from joining the Democrats and the black community of Indianapolis from forming 
a unified opposition to the Unigov bill.65 
 Overall, Unigov reduced the number of local governments from sixty in 1967 to 
fifty in 1970. The territorial jurisdiction of Indianapolis expanded from 82 to 402 square 
miles and increased the population from 480,000 to 740,000. The new City-County 
Council had twenty-nine members with twenty-five representing single-member districts 
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and the remaining four were elected at-large. All seats on the Council were up for 
election every four years and there was no term limit for the number of times a councilor 
could serve. The City-County Council also appointed a clerk who served a one year 
term.66  
 The mayor of the new Consolidated City of Indianapolis is elected to a four year 
term at the same time the City-County Council is elected. Following an amendment in 
1983, there is now no limit on the number of terms a mayor may serve. The mayor does 
have veto power over the City-County Council, but the veto can be overridden if two-
thirds of the council can agree. With the mayor as the head of the executive branch, there 
are six departments which he directly controls. They are Administration, Metropolitan 
Development, Parks and Recreation, Public Safety, Public Works, and Transportation.67 
 Unigov did not affect the Marion County court system and did not remove any of 
the nine township governments that independently elected township assessors, 
constables, and trustees. The nine township trustees continued to administer poor relief 
within their respective jurisdictions. Eight of the nine townships, Center Township being 
the exception, were the territorial basis for eight volunteer fire departments and for eight 
of the county’s eleven separate public school districts. The other three school districts 
were Southport, Beech Grove, and Speedway.68 
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 The reason why Beech Grove, Speedway, Lawrence, and Southport exist as 
separate cities is due to the Unigov law having excluded from reorganization any 
incorporated town with a population over 5,000. Therefore, these governments remained 
intact but the residents of the excluded cities also pay county taxes and receive county 
services. They are able to vote for the Consolidated City mayor and for a district City-
County councilor and the four at-large City-County councilors. Special Service Districts 
and Special Taxing Districts are also allowed under the Unigov bill, each performing a 
local government function over a specified domain, financed by a levy upon the residents 
within the specified area.69  This has created considerable complexity to the Unigov 
structure and has forced some residents to pay for both city and county services. An 
example of this is when Center Township residents pay for city police and the sheriff 
while county residents are not taxed for the city police services.  
Unigov was also unable to merge the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD) with the 
11 township fire departments. Volunteer fire departments are a long standing fixture in 
less urban Indiana communities, by which volunteer firemen have become “a strong 
cultural and social institution.” Therefore, it was expected that any challenge in the 
legislature over the sovereignty of volunteer fire departments would be met with strong 
resistance from rural legislators.70  There has yet to be a unified effort to unite multiple 
fire departments inside of Marion County. Even the state legislature in 1982 created a bill 
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in the Senate to give the City-County Council greater authority to consolidate IFD with 
the 11 townships fire departments but the bill died in committee. In the absence of a 
consolidation, IFD has a mutual aid agreement with surrounding townships and since 
1991 has had dual response pacts with Perry, Washington, and Warren Townships with 
the closest apparatus responding regardless of boundary lines. IFD also has the smallest 
taxing district in the city, ninety-three square miles.71 
 Fire department consolidation did start to happen in 2007 with Washington and 
Warren Township Fire Departments merging with IFD. Perry Township followed in 
2009, Franklin Township in 2010, and Lawrence Township in 2011.72 The autonomy of 
the township fire departments became too expensive to maintain. The Lawrence 
Township firefighters who were transferring to IFD received a raise in pay and in pension 
while at the same time leading to a substantial savings for tax payers.73 
 The Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) has faced a number of serious problems 
after the enactment of Unigov. In 1974 three Indianapolis Star reporters won a Pulitzer 
Prize for a number of articles alleging police brutality, pervasive political influence in 
appointments and promotions, shakedowns, embezzlement of funds, ghost employment, 
and connections to brothels and known burglars. What was unique to this story was that 
the Star reporters were able to get over 50 officers to violate the “code of silence.” At the 
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end of Mayor Lugar’s term in 1975, he stated that reform of IPD had eluded his best 
efforts. From 1982 through 1991 a disciplinary board of captains found guilty over 
ninety-eight percent of the 1,453 officers brought up on departmental charges ranging 
from tardiness to criminal acts. IPD has also faced serious community relations problems 
since the 1970s. Controversial police shooting fatalities, harassment, excessive force, the 
citizen complaint process, and the absence of credible civilian review have been some of 
the main complaints from citizens.74 
 It was not until 2007 that a law enforcement merger happened in Indianapolis. The 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was established on January 1, 2007 by 
consolidating the former Indianapolis Police Department with the law enforcement 
division of the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. The ordinance assigned 
responsibility for the police department to the sheriff who appointed a chief of police, 
under whose direction the department operated.75 The jurisdiction covers all of Marion 
County except for the Indianapolis Airport, Speedway, Beech Grove, and Lawrence. A 
2014 study by the city revealed that the anticipated savings of the merger have yet to 
materialize.76 
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Revitalizing Downtown Indianapolis 
Market Square Arena (viewed from the Soldiers and Sailors Monument) 
Market Square Arena sitting just east of the City Market building.77 
 The Lugar administration initiated a number of projects and got the ball rolling for 
the revitalization of downtown Indianapolis. These projects included amateur and 
professional sports, higher education, restoring cultural landmarks, and working with 
private and philanthropic organizations to make these plans a reality. One of the first 
projects to revitalize Indianapolis’ downtown was Market Square Arena (MSA) which 
was opened on September 15, 1974 as the fifth largest sports arena in the nation at the 
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time. MSA sat above the intersection of Market Street and Alabama and was located next 
to the City Market. The idea was to build a sports stadium downtown to bring 
Indianapolis’ only enduring major league professional team, the American Basketball 
Association’s Pacers, downtown as well.78 The Indianapolis Racers, a short-term major 
league hockey team in the World Hockey Association from 1974 to 1978, also called 
MSA home.79 Before the move the Pacers were playing their home games at the Indiana 
State Fairgrounds Coliseum. Using a surplus of federal funds, Lugar was able to build an 
arena but did require that it would be downtown. MSA was built for $23.5 million and 
brought new life to downtown. MSA hosted a number of memorable events such as 
Wayne Gretsky’s first professional goal for the Indianapolis Racers, Elvis Presley’s final 
concert, and even the 1980 NCAA Final Four.80 
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City Market (as seen from the Market Street and Delaware Street intersection) 
City Market located half a block west of the former Market Square Arena.81 
The renovation of the City Market located at 222 E Market Street began in 1972 
and lasted until 1977. This was a major undertaking for the revitalization of downtown. 
In 1974 it became listed in the National Register of Historic Places due to its being 
originally built in 1886. After being renovated the City Market now contains many 
different restaurant stalls but caters mostly to the downtown working class of the City-
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County building that sits directly across the street.82 The Lilly Endowment was also 
instrumental in the renovations of the City Market by providing $4.7 million in 1974.83 
The Lilly Endowment has been a constant ally for the city since the enactment of Unigov 
and is the main reason Indianapolis or Indiana has not needed to raise property taxes in 
order to sustain the city’s major projects through the 1970s and 1980s. 
Hyatt Regency Hotel and Eagles Nest 
Hyatt Regency Hotel and the rotating Eagles Nest Restaurant sitting atop.84 
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The Merchants Plaza is another part of the Lugar Administration’s downtown 
initiative and at the time was the largest privately developed project in the state’s history. 
The plaza takes up an entire city block; South Illinois Street is the eastern boundary with 
South Capitol Street to the west, West Washington Street to the north and Maryland 
Street as the southern boundary. The trapezoid designed complex hosts twin 15-story 
office towers, the office of Merchants National Bank (the company has since been bought 
out), the 535-room Hyatt Regency Hotel, which offers underground parking, and also 
contains restaurants and shops on the first three floors. The trademark of the Hyatt is the 
atrium which is a 19-story open lobby that is one of the largest enclosed spaces in the 
country. There is also a restaurant called The Eagles Nest located on the 20th floor of the 
building. The restaurant rotates, offering diners an unparalleled view of the city.85 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
The Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis (IUPUI) campus on the 
Near Westside is one of the most complicated projects that has been undertaken. Today 
the campus occupies the area between Michigan Street and New York Street that runs 
west of West Street. The White River acts as a natural boundary on the west side of 
campus. The motivation for I.U. and Purdue to merge in 1969 came from the desire of 
Lugar and the rest of the RAC for an independent state university in Indianapolis. Earlier 
efforts had been made to improve the educational opportunities for those in Indianapolis 
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but movement was slow at first. In 1964 the Metropolitan Plan Commission released 
detailed maps of a city plan for a three-part campus of 460 acres. The commission 
estimated it would take 20 years to complete. One of the reasons for this new campus 
proposal was legislative concern about the ability of the medical school to accommodate 
the growing demand for medical training. A study committee of the state legislature was 
also looking into either expanding or creating a second medical school for the state, 
something other state universities, notably Ball State in Muncie, IN, were eager to 
acquire. It was also noted that a four-year campus in Indianapolis would help attract more 
experienced faculty.86 
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IUPUI Campus 
IUPUI sits on the west side of downtown Indianapolis, just north of the White River State Park.87 
Matters of higher education were at the forefront of nearly everyone’s mind in 
Indianapolis in the 1960s. A study commission report in 1961 on the post-high school 
educational needs of the state led to the 1963 establishment of the Indiana Vocational and 
Technical School, otherwise known as Ivy Tech. I.U. and Purdue saw this as a potentially 
dangerous rival and opened their own regional campuses in all of Ivy Tech’s thirteen 
regions throughout the state. In 1968 the Stoner Commission’s report was released and 
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recommended the creation of a powerful statewide board of regents, one that would 
oversee the decisions of the boards of trustees in charge of operating the five state 
universities and control other matters of educational policy and finances. In defense of 
their autonomy, the universities managed to prevent the adoption of the recommendation 
for a board of regents by the state legislature at its next session in 1969. The idea of a 
board of regents was replaced in 1971 when the legislature created a less powerful 
organization called The Commission of Higher Education.88 This motivated I.U. and 
Purdue to the point where much of the initial planning for the merger of IU and Purdue’s 
Indianapolis campuses took place behind closed doors in unrecorded meetings. 
Mayor Lugar had also made a number of statements about establishing a state 
school in Indianapolis. At least one of the upcoming bills in the state legislature would 
call for the transfer of all existing public university property in the city to a newly created 
school. I.U. and Purdue administrators quickly realized that they would need more than a 
shared site for the regional campuses in Indianapolis to alleviate the pressure coming 
from the legislature. Mayor Lugar felt that a key factor to a great city was the strength of 
a distinguished city university. He saw a great need for a university to offer course work 
that would foster technology, scientific growth, and research. Mayor Lugar also said, 
“The government of the state and the city of Indianapolis is in need of the personnel, the 
discussion forums, and the many other contributions which a great university can make to 
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a good government.”89 He saw no reason why a university in Bloomington or West 
Lafayette needed to attempt to manage facilities all over the state of Indiana. Lugar also 
felt a board of regents would be better able to sort out claims of rival universities setting 
up extension centers in Indianapolis which would reduce redundancy in programing and 
allow that money to be spent elsewhere. He was basing his ideas off of the system the 
University of California uses for its multiple campuses.90 
The pressure put on I.U. and Purdue by the local Republican Party led to a 
mysterious, unpublicized, and unrecorded meeting in Indianapolis of the two university 
presidents, Joseph L. Sutton and Frederick L. Hovde, and some of their closest associates. 
The first public announcement came from the Indianapolis News on January 22, 1969. At 
this undisclosed meeting a merger plan was agreed to by both parties and then by the 
Indiana General Assembly in January 1969. Ralph Kramer, head of the Indianapolis 
News Lafayette-Purdue bureau, credited Beurt SerVass, president of Marion County 
Council, State Senator Larry Borst, and State Representative John Mutz with directly 
helping the merger. With both universities being publicly funded the initial meeting 
should have been formally documented. While the creation of IUPUI was authorized by 
the legislature, it was really established by two nearly identical resolutions adopted by the 
two sets of boards of trustees.91  
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SerVass and Borst both were hoping that by helping with the administrative 
merger they were getting one step closer to the eventual creation of an independent state 
university in Indianapolis. SerVass felt the two universities would not work because they 
were competitive, wary, guarded, and jealous of each other. He also felt that IUPUI 
would never be allowed to grow to its full potential since that could possibly overshadow 
I.U. or Purdue. Public sentiment for the new IUPUI campus was less than positive; 
WISH-TV even called the universities’ public statements explaining their actions 
“pompous” and was dismayed by the slow time table presented. The editorial concluded 
with, “If you do not intend to provide us with the services of a major state university, 
that’s fine, but don’t give us a lot of educational jargon and paper pipe-dreams to agree to 
have a school here someday, maybe.”92 
The deal I.U. and Purdue struck called for I.U. to have sole management 
responsibility of the Indianapolis campus while Purdue would take sole management in 
Fort Wayne. I.U. was now in charge of bringing all I.U. and Purdue operations within 
Indianapolis together at one site on the Near Westside of Indianapolis. I.U. would also 
have all appropriations and bonding authority for capital construction in Indianapolis and 
all personnel would also be paid through Indiana University.93 Total enrollment for I.U. 
and Purdue’s Indianapolis campuses in 1968 was 12,689 which included both full and 
part-time students. The faculty roster of full and part-time was above 2,500 before the 
merger. After the merger IUPUI’s first Chancellor, Maynard K. Hine, held office for the 
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first four years until his retirement in 1973.94 The IUPUI Chancellor reports directly to 
the President of Indiana University. 
After the merger the Indianapolis Star in 1971 conducted 400 interviews of adult 
residents (equally divided by gender) of Marion County about their perception of the 
newly created IUPUI. The results showed that seventy-nine percent favored eventually 
establishing a University of Indianapolis. Seventy-one percent believed the new 
university should include the Purdue Campus on Thirty-Eighth Street, the Herron School 
of Art, the downtown campus of I.U., and the law school, but not the medical or dental 
schools. Harrison Ullmann, head of the Indiana University News Bureau, forwarded the 
results and his analysis to Chancellor Hine. Ullmann noted that forty-nine percent of the 
respondents who said they were willing to be taxed for support of the proposed new 
university also indicated that they strongly favored the idea.95 Indiana and Purdue were 
politically astute and could see the writing on the wall if they did nothing; they have 
continually stayed just ahead of the state legislature to prevent an autonomous public 
university from being created in Indianapolis.  
IUPUI’s first commencement occurred on June 9th, 1970 at the Indiana State 
Fairgrounds Coliseum. This marked the third time that Purdue University had awarded 
undergraduate degrees in Indianapolis and the first time for Indiana University. IUPUI 
conferred 1,438 degrees in its first year and 1,727 in its second year, 1971. IUPUI was 
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expected to continue to grow since it was located in the political and economic center of 
the state with twenty-five percent of the state’s population in the metropolitan area of the 
capital city. 1971 alone saw a 13.8 percent increase in IUPUI programs.96 The rate at 
which IUPUI grew could never have been accomplished with a newly created university. 
However, with such a large percentage of the state’s population located so closely to 
downtown, Bloomington and West Lafayette have treated IUPUI as a potential rival and 
limited the opportunities available at the Indianapolis campus. 
During Mayor Lugar’s two terms his greatest accomplishment by far was the 
passage of Unigov, but that was not his only accomplishment. Lugar reversed the city’s 
antipathy to federal grants and ushered in a more active role for the city’s administration. 
Under the Lugar administration, the city saw the renovation and rededication of the 
historic City Market and the development of the Market Square Arena and Merchants 
Plaza. City partnerships also enabled the construction of a Hilton Hotel on Monument 
Circle.97 Lugar also worked to establish IUPUI as a major university for the city. He was 
also a supporter of the women’s movement and an increased political role for women; in 
1971 he even created a municipal Task Force on Women. When Lugar left the Mayor’s 
office for the U.S. Senate, the National Council on Municipal Performance had named 
Indianapolis “The City with the Healthiest Economy in the Nation.” The city’s bond 
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ranting was triple-A and in 1974 the city ranked sixth in the nation in the total value of 
new building permits.98 
While there was no official referendum on Unigov, Lugar’s reelection campaign 
ran on the platform of support for Unigov and for continuation of his redevelopment 
policies. The residents of Indianapolis supported him overwhelmingly in 1971 when he 
defeated John Neff (D) by a four-to-one margin, which amounted to 60.5 percent of all 
votes cast.99 This signified that Lugar and the RAC had covered all their bases and 
created Unigov in a way that most people in Marion County were willing to accept. This 
was a labor intensive task that put in place part of the infrastructure in place for 
Indianapolis to have the ability to develop into a major American city.  
Mayor William H. Hudnut III 
 The next Indianapolis Mayor, William H. Hudnut III, served four-terms in office, 
from 1976 to 1992. In 1983 the city-county council removed the term limit for 
Indianapolis mayor. William Hudnut was born on October 17, 1932 in Glendale Ohio, 
just outside of Cincinnati and came from two generations of itinerant Presbyterian 
ministers. Hudnut spent most of his childhood living in Springfield, Illinois before the 
family moved to Rochester, New York. Hudnut, like his father, attended Princeton 
University before attending New York’s Union Theological Seminary. After graduation, 
Hudnut accepted a job as assistant Reverend at Westminster Church in Buffalo, NY. By 
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the time Hudnut had reached the age of thirty, he was serving as pastor of the First 
Presbyterian Church in Annapolis, Maryland. At this time (1963) he was asked by the 
Second Presbyterian Church of Indianapolis to be their new minister. In 1973 Hudnut left 
his duties as minister to run for Indiana's eleventh congressional district seat, which he 
won. Hudnut was unable to win his reelection bid in 1975 due largely to being a 
Republican and the public backlash over the Watergate scandal. Indiana’s loss was 
Indianapolis’ gain as this allowed Hudnut to run for mayor in 1976; Hudnut defeated 
Democrat Robert V. Welch, an Indianapolis businessman, for mayor. For Hudnut, being 
mayor was much more satisfying than a congressman, which he proved by turning down 
another opportunity to run for Congress in 1982.100 
Mayor Hudnut was able to greatly expand the projects for downtown revitalization 
but still held many of the same ideas as the Lugar administration when it came to 
revitalizing downtown Indianapolis. In order to keep Indianapolis from expanding and 
growing uncontrollably, the Hudnut administration held two philosophies: downtown 
revitalization and the utilization of arts and sports to promote development. Hudnut 
wanted to encourage urban reinvestment without discouraging suburban investment. The 
idea was “You can’t be a suburb of nothing.” The goal was to try and stop the city from 
turning into a doughnut with all the good development taking place outside the I-465 
beltway and the downtown becoming an empty hole; instead, the shape of a cookie was 
desired, solid throughout.  
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In the early 1970s the Chamber of Commerce had commissioned a study by the 
Fantus Corporation which concluded that Indianapolis suffered from a “plain vanilla” 
image. To help with this the New York public relations firm of Jack Raymond & 
Associates was hired by the city to place favorable stories about Indianapolis in the 
national press. The creation of the Indiana Sports Corporation (ISC) was also responsible 
for helping create Indianapolis’ image as an amateur sports capital.101 The ISC was 
incorporated in 1979 as a private, not-for-profit entity made up of government officials 
and business leaders with the goal of making the city a viable option for amateur sporting 
events. Sandy Knapp ran the ISC from 1980 to 1991 and has helped to bring $165 million 
in sporting facilities and 230 amateur sporting events to Indianapolis with an estimated 
economic impact of $400 million.102 
Working with other organizations was the Indianapolis Economic Development 
Corporation (IEDC), which had been established as a point of contact between the city, 
state, and the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce to market the city and pursue new 
business opportunities for Indianapolis.103 The highlight of the IEDC is the “Visit Indy” 
program that coincides with the 500-mile-race weekend each year in late May. The 
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program takes invited guests from companies around the Indianapolis to spend three days 
becoming fully exposed to the city’s business potential and quality of life.104 
IUPUI Expands Amateur Athletic Venues 
IUPUI’s second Chancellor was Dr. Glenn W. Irwin who worked closely with 
William Hudnut and Indianapolis in its effort for the redevelopment of downtown. Dr. 
Irwin was IUPUI Chancellor from 1973 until 1986. During the Chancellor Irwin years 
IUPUI underwent many changes as Irwin was able to stretch the limited resources by 
combining efforts in urban renewal and downtown development that were already 
occurring. In order for the city to keep the National Clay Courts Tournament, a new $7 
million stadium was erected in 1979 and placed on land supplied by IUPUI. It was 
located on the south side of New York Street, adjacent to Military Park. Public-private 
partnership financing got the complex built as the city allocated $4 million from a 
redevelopment bond issue and the Lilly Endowment’s offer of a matching grant of $1.5 
million. The matching came as 100 companies pledged $15,000 each by purchasing the 
rights to box seats.105 The Indianapolis Tennis Center, as it was known, hosted the ATP 
(Association of Tennis Professionals) Tour tournament formerly known as the RCA 
Championships for three decades.106 
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This is the blueprint that allowed a world class natatorium and track stadium to be 
built on the campus of IUPUI as well. State legislators had approved $6 million for a new 
track and swimming pool in order to bring the School of Physical Education from its far 
north location at a sports camp on West Sixty-Fourth Street.107 In 1980 when outside 
funding from the Lilly Endowment and Krannert Charitable Trust became available, a 
$21.5 million facility was quickly approved.108 These new plans also called for an 
adjacent track and field stadium. A market analysis report concluded that a natatorium 
and track and field stadium would make Indianapolis a viable competitor in attracting 
major sporting events. The new track stadium and natatorium were completed in time to 
host the 1982 National Sports Festival that took place throughout the city.109 
A Dome in Indianapolis 
The use of sports to sell Indianapolis gained national recognition and Indianapolis 
successfully hosted events such as the 1980 NCAA Men’s Final Four and the 1982 
National Sports Festival, now known as the U.S. Olympic Sports Festival. The United 
States Olympic Committee (USOC) in 1978 implemented a new national multisport 
event that would help develop and prepare the athletes who would eventually represent 
the United States in the Olympic Games. This $2 million event was financed through 
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ticket sales totaling $1 million, six corporate underwriters, and 250 companies that made 
charitable contributions. The Lilly Endowment also contributed a significant amount of 
money to the building of venues for this event, including the IUPUI Natatorium with 
$21.5 million, the IUPUI track and field stadium with $5.9 million, and the Major Taylor 
Velodrome for cycling with $2.5 million.110  
However, there was still a growing need for larger stadiums to hold greater 
numbers of people for both sports and conventions. In order to make Indianapolis a 
potential site of future Final Fours, large conventions, and the one-day hope of a National 
Football League (NFL) team, the city would need a huge stadium. Mayor Hudnut felt if 
they built it first Indianapolis would be at the top of the list of potential cities for an NFL 
team. With an innovative financing plan, Hudnut was able to break ground on the 
Hoosier Dome before any commitment was given from a NFL team. The idea was to 
expand the Indiana Convention Center by building an $80 million addition, a 
multipurpose facility with meeting halls and exhibit space as well as a 60,000 seat 
auditorium with an inflated soft top over it. The football stadium was billed as an 
auditorium. Mayor Hudnut was quoted as saying, “We would not build a freestanding 
facility somewhere just for football. A domed stadium would draw people downtown and 
reinforce the core.” The project would be financed by gifts from the Lilly Endowment 
($25 million) and the Krannert Charitable Trust ($5 million), the purchase of suites by 
private companies and individuals (roughly $3 million), and a $47.5 million city revenue 
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bond issue, the debt on which would be financed by a one percent tax on food and 
beverage served in Marion County. No property tax money or federal dollars would be 
used. A provision in the legislation would provide that after the debt was paid off, the tax 
would disappear.111 The Hoosier Dome, later renamed the RCA Dome, had the main 
entrance located on Capitol Street. 
RCA Dome 
The RCA Dome as seen from Capitol Street.112 
Between 1982, when the city broke ground for the Hoosier Dome, and 1984, when 
Richard Irsay announced that his Baltimore Colts were moving to Indianapolis, 
Indianapolis had already booked into the unfinished facility $185 million of new 
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convention business for the latter years of the decade. With the completion of the Hoosier 
Dome, Indianapolis was able to show the world that it was no longer “Indiana-no place.” 
The Hoosier Dome was host to the Colts when they came to town in 1984, the NBA had 
its 1985 All-Star game in it with the largest crowd in attendance ever for an All-Star 
game, and the Pan-Am Games came in 1987. The 1987 Pan-Am Games introduced 
Indianapolis to the rest of the world. The Hoosier Dome would also play host to the 1991 
Men’s Basketball Final Four and the city would continually be awarded to host the Final 
Four once every five years.113 
The 1987 Pan-Am Games were originally awarded to Chile but when it and then 
Ecuador back out of hosting, it allowed for Indianapolis to step in. Mayor Hudnut led a 
delegation of city leaders to Mexico City to present the city’s bid for the games. A local 
organizing committee was formed to carry out planning and staging. This committee 
grew to eighteen operational divisions with 300 paid staff members and 37,000 
volunteers.114  
The games cost roughly $30 million since many of the venues used had been built 
for previous events or purposes such as Market Square Arena where the basketball games 
were held, Major Taylor Velodrome for cycling, IUPUI natatorium for swimming, and 
the track and field stadium as well as other venues. The games were paid for through $9 
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million in ticket sales, twenty-two corporate sponsors that contributed a minimum of 
$500,000 per sponsor, and eighty-three corporate suppliers who provided more than $2 
million in merchandising sales. Another $7 million came from federal government 
support in the form of grants and on Athletes Village per-diem.115  
The games involved over 6,000 athletes from North, South, and Central America. 
Approximately 40,000 volunteered to help the local organizing committee. The opening 
ceremonies, colorful and dramatic, were orchestrated by the Walt Disney Company at the 
Speedway with nearly 80,000 people in attendance. At the time, this turned out to be the 
largest outdoor live entertainment show ever staged in the United States, involving more 
than 29,500 volunteer performers. The vice-president of the United States, George H.W. 
Bush, even came to town to open the games.116  
The games are estimated to have brought in $175 million in direct economic 
impact and Indianapolis became the first host city of the games to break even 
financially.117 CBS also televised twenty-six hours of the event over three weekends. 
There were also 2,100 journalists representing 628 news organizations from thirty-six 
nations covering the games.118 This put Indianapolis in a national and international 
spotlight as it had never been before. Pan American Plaza, which consisted of the block 
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bounded by Union Station, the Hoosier Dome, Georgia Street, and Illinois Street, opened 
in 1987 and served as the media center for the games.  
White River State Park 
 Cultural attractions were also in mind for the redevelopment of downtown. The 
development of the White River State Park, which is located on both banks, lies just west 
of the mile square. It consists of 267 acres between Washington Street and New York 
Street.119 In the 1970s the area had become an industrial slum due to multiple factories 
leaving the area in the 1960s.120 In 1969 the Indianapolis Water Company discontinued 
using the Central Canal for a source of water power at its pumping station on West 
Washington Street and thereafter made the "downtown" portion (south of Sixteenth 
Street) available for sale.121 In 1971, the Central Canal was dedicated as an American 
Water Landmark by the American Water Association.  By 1976 the Water Company 
deeded this portion of the Canal to the City of Indianapolis, including the old Pumphouse, 
which in 1980 was accepted into the National Registry of Historic Places. In 1985 the 
Canal was drained south of Interstate 65 and this portion of the Canal was then lowered 
and rebuilt using concrete for its banks. The Canal was then refilled with a local 
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skyscraper's geothermal heating and cooling system which allowed for using ground 
rather than surface water.122 
Central Canal from inside the White River State Park 
The Central Canal on the west side of downtown Indianapolis.123 
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In 1979 the Indiana General Assembly created the White River State Park 
Development Commission as a quasi-governmental agency. The Lilly Endowment also 
provided $5 million in start-up money for the commission.124 It operates outside of the 
state park system and the Department of Natural Resources.  This was done so the 
Development Commission could build the park without restrictions often placed on state 
agencies. The Development Commission is composed of the mayor of the City of 
Indianapolis, the president of Indiana University, the director of the Department of 
Natural Resources, and seven citizens appointed by the governor for four year staggered 
terms.  Four members of the Indiana General Assembly also serve as non-voting 
members of the White River State Park Development Commission. Headquarters for the 
White River State Park Commission was placed in the Historic Pumphouse after the 1980 
renovation of the building.125 
 The first major permanent cultural attraction in the White River State Park was the 
Indianapolis Zoo in 1988. Before this the Indianapolis Zoo had been located at 
Washington Park on the northeast side of the city. The Indianapolis Zoo is run by the 
Indianapolis Zoological Society and in 1979 they commissioned a study to determine the 
possibility of moving the zoo. In 1982 the Zoological Society announced its intention to 
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relocate to the White River State Park. Construction began in April of 1986 and the zoo 
officially opened on June 11, 1988.126  
The Zoological Society ran a fundraiser before the move downtown and by 
December of 1987 had raised over $63 million. Major support came from the Lilly 
Endowment and Krannert Charitable Trust as well as thousands of donations from area 
corporations and individuals. These donations are important since the Indianapolis Zoo is 
one of the few zoos in the nation that receives no direct tax support. Local support for the 
Zoo can be seen in the charter membership that was offered in the spring 1988.The old 
zoo membership had been around 11,000 but 74,000 memberships were sold for the 
opening of the new zoo. By 1991 the Indianapolis Zoo had over 2,500 animals on sixty-
four acres and employed over 300 people during the summer season. The Zoo hosted 
over 900,000 visitors in 1991.127 
                                                          
126 David J. Bodenhamer, Robert G. Barrows, and David Gordon Vanderstel, The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 815-816. 
127 Ibid. 
64 
 
Eitleljorg Museum (Main Entrance) 
The Eiteljorg Museum as seen from Washington Street.128 
 The Eiteljorg Museum of American Indian and Western Art was the next cultural 
addition to the White River State Park and as of 1993 was one of only two museums east 
of the Mississippi to combine collections of American western and Native American art. 
The Eiteljorg was opened in 1989 and most of the collection was donated by Harrison 
Eiteljorg, an Indianapolis businessman and philanthropist. A large portion of Native 
American art and cultural objects were acquired as the result of a merger with the 
Museum of Indian Heritage. The museum’s permanent collection includes 400 paintings 
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and bronzes and 2,000 artifacts. The Eiteljorg is dedicated to preserving and interpreting 
the history of the American West through displays, exhibitions, and educational 
programs. By 1993 over 125,000 people were annually visiting the museum.129 
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Downtown Cultural Attractions 
Union Station 
Central Station after being repurposed into a festival market place.130 
 Another downtown cultural attraction is Union Station which was the nation’s first 
centralized station for the common use of passengers of many independent rail lines. It 
was constructed south of the present station in 1852-1853. The current Union Station was 
built in 1887-1888 and was designed in the Romanesque Revival style by Thomas Rodd 
of Pittsburgh. This has made it one of the city’s most historically and architecturally 
significant buildings. When Penn Central fell into bankruptcy in 1970 Union Station 
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nearly shut its doors forever. The building was falling apart but was listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places in 1974 and developer Robert Borns turned Union Station into 
a festival marketplace to save it. A $30 million restoration project was needed to convert 
the building for its new use and the restoration was completed in 1986 with over 100 
restaurants and shops ready for business. Results have been less than hoped for with low 
revenues, high turnover among shops and poor security. In 1993 over 4.2 million people 
visited the 34 retail stores, 18 food outlets, and 7 bars located inside the station.131 The 
project enjoyed success for about ten years before encountering financial troubles but 
should be credited with laying the foundation for the nearby Circle Centre Mall.132 
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Indiana Repertory Theatre 
The Indiana Repertory Theatre as seen from Washington Street.133 
 Another recently renovated downtown landmark is the Indiana Repertory Theatre 
located on West Washington Street near the Indiana State House. The theater was saved 
in 1980 when the Indiana Repertory Theatre (IRT) needed a new venue with more 
performing space for larger crowds. The building was originally built in 1927 and 
became listed in the National Register of Historical Places in 1979.134 It stands out among 
Indianapolis buildings with its Spanish Baroque exterior of pure white glazed terra cotta. 
The Spanish theme is carried through to all major spaces, including the main lobby, upper 
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lobby, theater interior, and Indiana Roof Ballroom.135 The Mainstage Theater seats 600 
and is where regular season performances take place. There are also two smaller stages 
for smaller productions. The theater underwent a $5 million renovation in 1979-1980 in 
order to accommodate the incoming IRT.136 
The Children’s Museum of Indianapolis 
The Children’s Museum of Indianapolis which lies just north of downtown.137 
A unique Indianapolis treasure that has been well supported is the Children’s 
Museum of Indianapolis which was originally founded in 1925 and then moved to its 
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current location at 3010 N. Meridian Street in 1946. After a number of expansions to the 
building it was decided to have a capital fund drive for a new building. In 1973 $8.78 
million was raised and the Parry House facilities were demolished. The new building was 
completed in 1976 and more than doubled the exhibit space and also added new 
classrooms, administration offices, and the 350-seat Ruth Lilly Theater. The building has 
five floors in all and includes a mastodon skeleton, carousel, and simulated cave.138  
The museum has continued to grow with the city. In 1984 it received the 50,000 
item Caplan folk art and toy collection, which nearly doubled the size of the museum’s 
holdings. As a result a $14 million expansion project began in 1987 which produced a 
new atrium entrance and welcome center that was completed in 1988 and the 130-seat 
Space Quest Planetarium completed in 1989. In 1990 the Eli Lilly Center for Exploration 
was completed. By 1992, The Children’s Museum was attracting over 800,000 visitors 
annually to its 4,000 programs and activities while maintaining a collection of over 
140,000 artifacts. It has a staff of approximately 165 full-time employees, 227 part-time, 
and over 850 volunteers. The Children’s Museum now encompasses a whole city block 
on 30th street between Illinois and Meridian. 
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Indiana Avenue 
Walker Building and Theatre 
The Madame C.J. Walker Building and Theatre as seen from West Street.139 
One of the few bright spots for the black community under Unigov was the 
restoration of the Madame C.J. Walker Building and Theatre that sits at the corner of 
West Street and Indiana Avenue. It was opened in 1927 and was designated a National 
Historic Landmark in 1991. Indiana Avenue was originally one of the few areas in the 
city that would rent to black residents in the 1920s through the 1950s. During this time 
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the Indianapolis black community was anchored around the Walker Building and Theatre 
on Indiana Avenue. As other parts of the city opened up to blacks, Indiana Avenue and 
the Walker Building fell into disrepair. In 1979 the Lilly Endowment provided funds to 
the Walker Urban Life Center to buy the building and save it from being demolished. 
This restoration project was designed to spur economic redevelopment on Indiana 
Avenue.140 It was not until 1988 that the Madame C.J. Walker Building was fully 
restored.141 The Walker Building is the best-known historic building associated with the 
black community of Indianapolis and in 1991 was designated as a National Historic 
Landmark.142  
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Outline of Lockefield Gardens 
The black outline signifies the original size of the housing project before it was partially torn 
down after falling into disrepair.143 
                                                          
143 "Lockefield Gardens Historic District." Indianapolis Government. Accessed December 17, 2014. 
http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/DMD/IHPC/Documents/Maps/lockefieldgardensmap.jpg. 
74 
 
The renovation of Lockefield Gardens located adjacent to the IUPUI campus was 
also vital to the redevelopment of the Near Westside. Lockefield Gardens, completed in 
1938, was the second oldest public housing project in the country and is one of the few 
remnants of the poor African-American community that stood there before the university 
arrived. In the 1970s Lockefield Gardens had fallen into vacancy and disrepair, glass 
windows were broken out, and doors swung open freely on rusty hinges.144 Lockefield 
Gardens had become seriously deteriorated and the city was prohibited by Federal Judge 
S. Hugh Dillin from redeveloping the housing for low-income families for fear it would 
perpetuate residential segregation and, consequently, educational segregation. In the 
summer of 1980 an agreement was reached with the city, the federal government, IUPUI, 
preservationists, and former residents. Through all these groups an action plan was 
created where the city would declare a portion of Lockefield Gardens an urban renewal 
area and make funds available to MEDIC (the neighborhood leadership group).  
The plan would also called for work with HUD and the private sector to 
accomplish the restoration of up to 275 housing units and another 150 units for the 
elderly on the other side of Indiana Avenue and build a new street through the area. The 
university also took some of the land for its medical school campus but agreed not to 
move any farther. The situation turned around and Lockefield Gardens was fully 
occupied by the early 1990s.145 This plan also called for the demolition of two-thirds of 
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the twenty-four buildings, saving and renovating the rest, while also building several new 
apartments on the site for mixed-income housing. The demolition also permitted the 
realignment of the street between the apartments and the university.146 
Unigov’s Improvement in Education 
Notable academic achievement also brought recognition to Indianapolis. IUPUI 
Vice Chancellor Edward Moore and noted philosopher Max Fisch organized the Pierce 
Edition Project in 1976. The project focused on Charles Sanders Pierce, whose papers 
had been saved and brought to IUPUI by Moore. Indiana University Press, with grants 
from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation, 
had agreed to publish a selection of the Pierce Papers in twenty or more volumes. Pierce 
is considered to be the founder of modern semiotics, the general theory of signs, and the 
father of pragmatism, a major development in the history of American philosophy. The 
first volumes began being published in the early 1980s.147 
In the early 1980s, IUPUI also sponsored what was to become the Journal of the 
Early Republic, but at the time was a new unnamed journal on a three year trial basis. It 
was stipulated that the circulation must reach 1,000 readers by the end of the trial period. 
The journal was a venture by the national organization the Society of Historians of the 
Early American Republic (SHEAR), who agreed to put its journal within the confines of 
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an institution that at the time had no graduate program in the field. Others offered to host 
it but SHEAR’s executive council accepted IUPUI’s three year trial offer and the first 
issue appeared in April of 1981.148 
These academic achievements helped to lead to the creation of the Project On-line 
Indianapolis Study which was shorten to POLIS in 1989. POLIS was established to link 
two types of expertise, academic and practical, for the benefit of communities in Indiana 
and elsewhere. Geospatial technologies, especially GIS, emerged as the preferred 
technical tools because of their unique ability to integrate and visualize information by 
location. This capacity and the collaborative approach meant that POLIS could develop 
and analyze data for any geographic area and involve local experts in helping to 
understand what the results would mean for local communities. The first project was the 
Encyclopedia of Indianapolis and this was due to Indianapolis having the largest deficit 
of knowledge about the city. There was not a lot of published information on Indianapolis 
compared to other cities of similar size. 485 authors were needed for the project which 
ended up being 1600 pages and was published in 1994.  
POLIS is a self-funded research unit of the I.U. School of Liberal Arts at IUPUI. 
The POLIS approach to better understand the communities in which we live uses 
practical, effective, and cost-efficient ways for communities to be able to enhance their 
capacity for meaningful change.149 While the program has provided useful knowledge, 
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the benefits to the local community are limited by the fact that the IUPUI School of 
Liberal Arts is only able to offer Ph.D. coursework in Economics. 
IUPUI has grown tremendously since its inception. Total enrollment for IUPUI 
rose steadily between 1969 and 1977, going from 13,382 to 21,700, and then it dropped 
to 20,500 in 1978. Enrollment rose to 21,500 in 1979 and 22,800 in 1980. Slight 
increases throughout the 1980s and early 1990s carried enrollment to 28,000 in 1992. 
According to university self-studies, female students rose from forty-one percent of the 
student population in 1972 to fifty-nine percent of the student population in 1992. Other 
groups on campus have not been so fortunate; for instance, black student rates fell 
slightly from 9.7 percent in 1972 to eight percent in 1992.150 
The Indiana University Medical Center on the IUPUI campus has helped to 
expand the population and size of the IUPUI campus. When Mayor Hudnut left office in 
early 1992, the Medical Center sat on eighty-five acres and was home to the Indiana 
Schools of Medicine, Nursing, Dentistry, and Allied Health, and six hospitals with over 
2,100 beds. Indiana University owns Riley, University, and Long Hospitals, and has 
managed Wishard Memorial Hospital, formally Marion County General, since 1975. The 
Indiana Medical School achieved an international reputation in 1963 when a team of 
physicians developed the echocardiograph (EKG). Also, an advanced bone marrow 
transplant program, the nation’s only noncommercial DNA bank, and the largest pediatric 
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cardiology program in the country, have enabled IUPUI to be a leader in medical 
research and training.151 These assets and others at IUPUI have allowed for research 
grants to increase from $38 million in the 1985-86 school year to $88 million for the 
1991-92 school year.152 
Indianapolis Economic Development 
The Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical Company has been a receptive corporate partner in 
downtown development. This is important since it is also the city's largest employer and 
most important corporate citizen. The development of a campus on the south side of 
downtown includes a large research facility, technology center, new administrative 
offices, parking garages, a new production facility for human insulin, and a home for the 
new Cray-2 supercomputer. The city vacated the streets, relocated a sewer line, pledged 
$44 million toward the reconstruction of several major thoroughfares, and worked on 
some river levees. In return Lilly committed approximately $1 billion to new capital 
projects it could have built anywhere else in the world. This worked out for the city and 
the Lilly campus and could not have been done without each other’s cooperation.153 
 The early 1990s started off extremely well for Indianapolis. Hosting the 1991 
Men’s Final Four brought in an economic impact of $39 million as well as national 
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recognition to the city. Indianapolis was able to take advantage of the Hoosier Dome and 
the NCAA’s desire to start having the Final Four hosted in larger venues. The United 
States Postal Service announced Indianapolis’ bid had been selected as the city for its 
new $62 million mail-sorting facility. This proved that Indianapolis could compete 
nationally for economic development projects as well as athletic events. The city had 
already landed a Federal Express sorting facility for the Indianapolis Airport, making it a 
secondary hub to Memphis, which helped in landing the USPS deal. The USPS project 
would provide 750 new Postal Service jobs for the Indianapolis area.154  
 In mid-October of 1991 the foundation was poured for Circle Centre Mall. The 
timing was difficult because a general business restructuring and an economic downturn 
made investors weary and financing more challenging to obtain. As the economy began 
to sour in the late 1980s, it became difficult to arrange financing for commercial projects. 
The project took a serious hit when Saks Fifth Avenue pulled out and the developer was 
struggling with financing.155 Huge holes pocked the downtown landscape and the city 
had already invested $230 million. With the project stalled, Indianapolis’ reputation and 
downtown revitalization project were on the line. After Mayor Hudnut visited with CEOs 
of several Indianapolis companies, Eli Lilly and Company took the lead, with several 
other companies signing on. The final agreement was reached in September of 1991. The 
consortium headed by Eli Lilly pledged a total of more than $50 million to become 
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partners with the Simon brothers, Herb and Mel.156 The project would not be completed 
until 1995. 
Artsgarden at Circle Centre Mall 
Indianapolis Artsgarden hovers 17 feet above the intersection of Washington and Illinois streets and 
connects to the Embassy Suites complex, the Conrad Hotel, and Circle Centre Mall. 157 It is linked by the 
indoor skywalk to the Hyatt Regency, Canterbury, Omni, Westin, Marriott and the Indianapolis 
Convention Center. The Artsgarden is owned and operated by the Arts Council of Indianapolis, and 
houses the Cultural Concierge, a centralized source for arts calendars, free maps, visitor guides, and 
other information on Indianapolis arts and cultural events.158 
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 Shortly after the pouring of the mall foundation, United Airlines (UAL) chose 
Indianapolis as the site for a new billion-dollar facility to maintain its expanding fleet of 
Boeing 737s. UAL promised to build a three-million-square-foot complex at Indianapolis 
International Airport that would produce 6,300 permanent new jobs within 12 years at an 
average annual wage and benefit package of $45,000. The project would also generate an 
estimated 12,000 temporary construction jobs and some 18,000 to 20,000 spin-off jobs, 
providing a ten-year economic impact of more than $1 billion.159 
 The other side of the city’s economic development plan in the early 1980s 
involved the assistance of Central Research Systems, David Birch of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), and local business and professional leaders for the city’s 
economic development. One of the first things they discovered was that Indianapolis 
could not ignore manufacturing because of how prominent it was throughout the state.160 
Manufacturing was the major industry in both the 1960s and 1970s, employing more than 
thirty percent of workers in Marion County.161 Indiana has more factories than farms and 
both have a strong lobby at the statehouse. The other finding that came out of this study 
was that most of the future job growth for the city would come from small businesses. 
Indianapolis was demonstrating a growth in company start-ups, along with small firms 
(twenty or fewer people), that was superior to any other city in the nation.162 
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 The city and David Birch of MIT in the 1980s concluded that certain industries 
should be targeted for priority retention/expansion and attraction: industrial automation, 
telecommunications, instrumentation and test equipment, health care technology and 
services, and software and consumer electronics. The plan also recommended certain 
strategic mechanisms to support the effort to capitalize on the city’s resources and assets 
such as numerous business start-ups, a growing pool of young, well-educated people, and 
a promising foundation in leading edge industries. The mechanisms included an 
innovative development corporation, enhanced support for education, innovative 
development financing, and a technology-oriented complex. This was to be undertaken in 
a three-way partnership between business, education, and government with high-profile 
leadership and support.163 
 Increased government spending also helped local businesses and that has only 
been possible though Unigov. In 1971 the city’s expenditures totaled $763 million. The 
following year expenditures topped $1 billion and then remained in the $1.1 to $1.25 
billion range until the late 1980s, when the city’s expenditures began to rise steadily 
through the 1990s. Revenues increased on a similar trajectory, topping $1 billion in 1973 
and remaining very stable through the end of the 1980s. By expanding the city’s 
boundaries and keeping the growth of higher income residents of the northern Marion 
County suburbs within city limits, Indianapolis likely prevented a rise in tax rates to 
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support city services.164 Employment growth was also positive in Indianapolis during the 
Lugar and Hudnut administrations. Employment in Indianapolis-Marion County grew by 
forty-three percent from 1970 to 1989. Most jobs created during this time period were in 
the lower paying service sector.165 
William Hudnut’s four terms as mayor have often been characterized by an 
entrepreneurial spirit that involved collaboration, conciliation, and inclusion. He was a 
careful fiscal manager and maintained Indianapolis’ triple-A bond rating. The city had a 
surplus of $300 million at the end of Hudnut’s fourth mayoral term. Hudnut had a 
penchant for coalition building and used multiple public and private partnerships during 
his time as mayor. He expanded the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee and created 
the Indianapolis Economic Development Corporation, which helped to reach out to 
additional members of the business and civic leadership within the city. Revitalization of 
the urban core was the highest priority of his administration and a variety of incentive 
packages, job training programs, and infrastructure improvements supported this goal.166 
Under both Lugar and Hudnut, Unigov’s accomplishments, with the help of outside 
funding, can most clearly be seen in economic development.  
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Portland’s Downtown Development 
 Downtown Portland 
Map of downtown Portland.167 
Neil Goldschmidt, a Democrat, was the Mayor of Portland from 1973-1979 and 
also played a key role in how Portland was able to handle modern urban sprawl. He was 
thirty-two years old when he became mayor and his ideas were strongly influenced by the 
1970 census that showed a declining proportion of middle class families, neighborhood 
diversity and city tax base. During his first term in the mayor’s office, Goldschmidt and 
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his team of young policy specialists put together a “population strategy” that emphasized 
public transportation, neighborhood revitalization, and downtown planning.168 The 
population of Portland was 381,877 in 1970 but growth had not been steady as the 1980 
census showed a loss of more than 13,000 residents. 
Portland population form 1950-2010.169 
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Goldschmidt and his advisors felt that improved public transit would improve air 
quality, enhance the attractiveness of older neighborhoods, and bring workers and 
shoppers downtown. A vital central business center would protect property values in 
surrounding districts and increase their attractiveness for residential reinvestment. With 
neighborhood planning, the focus was on housing rehabilitation and on visible amenities 
to keep older residential areas able to compete with the suburbs. Preservation of the user 
friendly downtown has been the cornerstone of the “population strategy” of the compact 
city model.170 Portland was developing better and better amenities for people to live, 
work, and spend their leisure time in the downtown.  
Metro, which is the directly elected regional government that serves the urbanized 
areas of Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington Counties, also operates the park 
system, the Oregon Zoo, the downtown Performing Arts Center and oversees the Oregon 
Convention Center. Metro has also been designed to be a planning agency and is 
designated as the metropolitan planning organization (MPO) for the allocation of federal 
transportation funds. This agency maintains the Urban Growth Boundary under the 
Oregon land use planning system.171 
 With the state government of Oregon and the Metro government of Portland 
collaborating, the center of Portland has retained its economic dominance in the 
metropolitan area. The central office core has upgraded average job quality and increased 
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the total number of jobs since the 1970s. Jobs in the five core census tracks increased 
from 63,000 in 1970 to 108,000 in 1995 with jobs in adjacent tracts growing from 40,000 
to 50,000 during the same time span. Central Portland also claims all major city 
institutions and gathering places such as art, history, and science museums, the 
Performing Arts Center and the Civic Auditorium, Portland State University and Oregon 
Health Sciences University, several major hospitals, the Civic Stadium, the Oregon 
Convention Center, and the Rose Garden Arena. Pioneer Courthouse Square in the heart 
of the retail core hosts political rallies and community events. It should also be noted that 
as of 2001 Portland lacked a “dead zone” of derelict industrial districts and abandoned 
neighborhoods that surround the high-rise core of many cities.172  
 Portland’s lack of a “dead zone” has a lot to do with its public transit system. The 
Oregon State Highway Department created plans for the Mt. Hood Freeway in 1955 as 
part of a report that advised the Portland area to build fourteen new freeways. In 1969, a 
deal was made with the federal Bureau of Public Roads that Mt. Hood Freeway would 
be granted status as Interstate 80 North. This meant that the new freeway would be able 
to be constructed with ninety-two percent of the $75 million cost coming from the federal 
government. Mayor Neil Goldschmidt and other local officials led the public in their 
desire to rejuvenate Portland's downtown core, clean up its air, and expand the new 
public mass-transit system. Downtown Portland businesses were convinced that a 
centrally focused public transit would be more beneficial than a second eastside radial 
                                                          
172 Ibid,, 146-147. 
88 
 
freeway.173 The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Federal 
Clean Air Act of 1970 proved to be tremendous hurdles for the Mt. Hood Freeway to 
overcome.174 
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Map of Proposed Freeway 
 
This map from the Portland Planning Division's 1966 development plan illustrates Robert Moses' vision 
for a city girdled by freeways. Red indicates existing freeways; green indicates freeways that were never 
built.175 
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 With little public support for the highway, the state of Oregon under the provisions 
of the 1973 Federal Aid Interstate Highway Act requested an exchange of Interstate 
Highway funds for federal dollars that could be used on mass transit and road 
improvement projects. The Mount Hood Freeway project was officially cancelled in 1975 
and in 1976 the U.S. Department of Transportation agreed to exchange the approximately 
$180 million, once targeted for the construction of the freeway, for a similar amount that 
could be used on other transportation projects, including mass transit. The Mt. Hood 
Freeway was then officially removed from the Interstate Highway System. Over the next 
decade and a half, funds once designated to build the most controversial road in 
Portland's history were used elsewhere in the Portland area, including for the city's 
first MAX light-rail line.176 Due to this investment in public transport the number of 
automobiles entering and leaving downtown Portland did not rise from 1987 to 1997.177 
Another unique planning aspect of downtown Portland began in the 1930s when 
the city had the rotting wharves and trash-strewn riverbank replaced with an interceptor 
sewer and seawall. Harbor Drive, a bypass for downtown, was then built on the newly 
filled in land.178 By 1950, Harbor Drive, which ran adjacent to downtown along the 
western bank of the Willamette River, had become Portland's first limited-access 
highway, carrying six lanes of traffic. Because of the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act 
more freeways were built in the city during the 1960s. This included Interstate 5 on the 
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eastern bank of the Willamette River and Interstate 405, a western bypass around 
downtown, which made Harbor Drive less important as a long-haul freeway route.179 
In January of 1967, newly elected Governor Tom McCall, a Republican, pledged 
his support for the beautification of the west bank of the Willamette River. McCall 
mentioned the City Beautiful plans at the turn of the century that had envisioned parks 
and greenways along the river. Governor McCall even fought the Oregon State Highway 
Department which proposed a Harbor Drive expansion. By 1968 Governor McCall called 
for a study to evaluate the removal of Harbor Drive, envisioning a park along the 
waterfront and a series of linked open spaces as part of the Willamette Greenway. 
Completion of the I-405 freeway and the Fremont Bridge provided a replacement route 
for Harbor Drive. In 1974 Harbor Drive was closed and replaced by Tom McCall 
Waterfront Park.180  
In 1972, Portland began to experience rapid growth and a high rise boom in the 
downtown. Faced with a lack of green space, increased traffic congestion and 
environmental neglect of the Willamette River, a Mayor’s Citizen’s Advisory Committee 
was established to develop a new Portland Downtown Plan. Citizen goals focused on 
recreation and open space and views, but did not stress public access to the river or 
improvement of the river habitat. Based on the recommendations of the Downtown Plan, 
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the city made a commitment to redevelopment and set up the Waterfront Urban Renewal 
District. Portland would use tax increment financing to make large scale public 
improvements that would include building Governor Tom McCall Waterfront Park.181  
Successfully removing a highway and replacing it with useful green space did not 
happen overnight. The first plan for the waterfront was produced in August 1975 by the 
architecture firm Wolff Zimmer Gunsul Frasca (WZGF) in Portland in conjunction with 
Royston, Hanamoto, Beck and Abey of San Francisco. Implementation of the plan was 
initiated by the Portland Development Commission (PDC) with tax-increment funds over 
the next twelve years, from 1976–1988, in five phases. Construction began first along 
Front Avenue and the Ankeny Plaza area. This was followed by four subsequent 
redevelopment projects until the last section, north of the Burnside Bridge, was 
completed in 1989. Development of the park as it is seen today occurred over seventeen 
years in five phases at the cost of approximately $20 million dollars.182 The thirty-six acre 
Waterfront Park opened in 1978. In1984 the park was renamed after former Governor 
Tom McCall, who had passed away the year before.183 
Portland and Indianapolis from the 1970s through the 1990s took on a number of 
different projects that were able to create growth. Each city had dynamic leaders who saw 
current problems as opportunities. The growth of these two cities were built on vastly 
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different foundations. Portland, through the use of city and county commissions and 
Urban Growth Boundary, was able to create sustainable growth. Investing Federal 
highway funds into public transit helped to decrease auto pollution, traffic, and prevent a 
dead zone of abandoned housing and factories. 
Indianapolis, however, relied more on private and charitable contributions to 
rebuild its downtown. Unigov created an unequal tax structure that has forced Center 
Township residents to bear a heavier burden of the taxes needed to encourage growth 
throughout the city. While many of the city’s improvements have been located in Center 
Township, most of the jobs that have come with these improvements have been low 
paying service industry jobs. This has also had the effect of disenfranchising Center 
Township residents who are predominantly black.  
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Chapter 2 Lack of Collaboration and Compromise 
Center Township 
The Indianapolis Public School system (IPS) has not been able to provide the 
same opportunities as a suburban school since shortly after the graduations of notable 
Indiana authors Kurt Vonnegut Jr. (1940), Dan Wakefield (1950), and Indiana statesman 
Richard Lugar (1950) from Shortridge High School.  The white flight to the suburbs has 
hurt IPS in several way including the lack of leadership from the Indianapolis Public 
Schools Board of School Commissioners, and citizens who do not vote in school board 
elections or for referendums over the raising of taxes to support local schools. Unigov 
and the center city tax abatements that have been used to revitalize downtown have also 
hurt IPS funding and no additional funding has been appropriated from the city or the 
state to make up for these tax abatements. These poor educational opportunities also 
inhibit job growth in the area that IPS serves.  
One of the most disappointing political realities of Unigov was the inability to 
bring any better solution than eleven different school districts in Marion County. The 
state of Indiana had failed to consolidate any Marion County school districts in 1959 
when it passed the School Corporation Reorganization Act, commonly known as the 
school consolidation bill.184 By 1959, the disparity in education between rural schools 
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and urban schools was too large to ignore. By 1968 the consolidation bill had dropped the 
number of public schools in Indiana from 939 to 382, and more than ninety percent of 
Indiana students attended school in consolidated districts run by professional 
administrators.185 With no public support, no one from the state government was willing 
to enforce the law and consolidate any public school corporation in Marion County. 
Indianapolis Public Schools have faced the most problems of any school 
corporation since the 1950s when white flight began and Center Township residents 
moved to the suburban townships and out of the pre-Unigov city. In 1968 the U.S. 
Department of Justice filed a suit against the Indianapolis School Board, accusing them 
of gerrymandering school districts to perpetuate segregation, failure to integrate Crispus 
Attucks High School, and failure to integrate teaching staffs.186 The Unigov provision to 
not consolidate schools would directly come into play during this case, and even though 
the suit was filed before the passage of the Unigov bill, it would still have a direct effect 
on how segregation in the Indianapolis Public Schools was to be solved. 
Indianapolis Public Schools and Desegregation 
 The U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) had jurisdiction over Indianapolis Public 
Schools (IPS) through the 1964 Civil Rights Law. In April of 1968 the DOJ made IPS 
aware that they had received a complaint of racial discrimination and the subsequent DOJ 
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investigation proved the complaint had merit. The investigation found that the school 
system’s practices with respect to student and teacher assignments denied black students 
in Indianapolis equal protection of laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.187 The 
letter sent to IPS was meant to alert the school board to the DOJ findings and provide the 
school system an opportunity to take the appropriate steps to eliminate voluntarily the 
racially discriminatory practices that had been found in the operation of IPS.188 In 1968 
the U.S. Justice Department filed a petition against the Indianapolis Public Schools, 
claiming the city was operating a de jure segregated school system. This meant that the 
school system was accused of explicitly making administrative decisions on the basis of 
race that resulted in segregated schools, not merely failing to compensate for changes in 
housing patterns or other circumstances that result in de facto segregation.189 
 The IPS response came from Mark Gray, school board member, who stated that 
IPS would stand firm on the neighborhood school concept and that there was no hint of 
segregation in assigning pupils or teachers. For good measure IPS also claimed that the 
DOJ had no jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.190  Denying the charges and 
jurisdiction of the DOJ while at the same time taking steps to further desegregation set 
Indianapolis Public Schools on a doomed course that would demand large amounts of 
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time from the school board and huge expenditures in legal fees from the school system. 
Both hurt the quality of education that IPS was able to provide to its students. 
 Part of the reason that many felt IPS was not segregated and that Indiana was at 
the forefront of desegregation was due to the Indiana Educational Desegregation Law of 
1949. This law stated that it was the public policy of Indiana to provide public schools 
“equally open to all and prohibited and denied to none because of race, creed, color, or 
national origin”, and to “abolish, eliminate, and prohibit segregated and separate schools 
or school districts on the basis of race, creed, or color.” This policy applied to public 
kindergartens, common schools, public schools, colleges, and universities of the state. 
The law further provided that there shall be no discrimination “in any way in hiring, 
upgrading, tenure, or placements of any teacher on the basis of race, creed, or color.” 
This law also provided a strict schedule schools were expected to adhere to in order to 
complete the desegregation process in a timely manner.191 Superficial compliance soon 
took hold. 
 IPS school officials stated that elementary school district lines be adhered to 
firmly and declared this in policy statements as well. White children were still allowed to 
transfer out of predominately black school districts and it was not required for the 
principals to report these transfers to administrators. “The Negro high school enrolls 
Negroes from optional school districts in which whites also have the privilege of 
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attending either mixed high schools or the Negro high school.”192 This gave the local 
illusion that voluntary desegregation was happening and that doing nothing was really 
doing something. Even less was done by way of having black teachers teach white 
students. Black teachers were still assigned to predominately black schools while white 
teachers taught white and mixed schools. 
 Judge S. Hugh Dillin of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana was assigned to the case. The trial did not actually begin until July 12, 1971 
and the case was heard without a jury. DOJ was aiming to prove that IPS was guilty of de 
jure segregation as opposed to de facto segregation and this was mainly pertaining to the 
elementary schools.193 Judge Dillin handed down his verdict in August of 1971 in which 
he found IPS guilty of de jure segregation. He cited such examples as IPS moving 
students from overcrowded schools but not moving them to the school in closest 
proximity to their homes. Of the approximately 350 changes in school boundaries since 
1954, more than 90 percent had the effect of increasing segregation.194  
Dillin also noted various other factors such as the city’s segregated residential 
practices due to realtor policies and restrictive covenants. Added to this was the policy of 
only building public housing in Center Township.195 Judge Dillin also noted the 
restrictions on IPS to annex land in the white suburbs. The annex restrictions had come 
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from the Indiana General Assembly two weeks before the passage of the Unigov act, 
which amended the 1961 law that stated that as Indianapolis expanded by annexation, the 
Indianapolis city school expansion could be blocked if the township school system 
objected.196 The amendment was to bar all future city school consolidation through 
annexation.197 Unigov therefore kept IPS as it was while at the same time perpetuating 
segregation by allowing the township schools, Beech Grove, and Speedway to accept 
transfer students from IPS if the family of the individual student was able to pay 
tuition.198 
 In Judge Dillin’s decision he brought up the effect of Unigov on the school 
systems of Marion County: “Were the provisions excluding school corporations 
unconstitutional as tending to cause segregation or to inhibit desegregation of IPS? If 
true, did the adoption of Unigov automatically extend the boundaries of IPS to include 
the entire Unigov area?” In order to answer these questions, Judge Dillin had the DOJ 
add all concerned parties to the suit. The failure of the 1949 Indiana Educational 
Desegregation Law in Marion County had become evident. Judge Dillin ordered IPS to 
move students within IPS to make sure no more schools reached the tipping point of 
having the black student population at forty percent or above.199 The DOJ found that once 
the black population in a school reached forty percent it was next to impossible to 
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desegregate due to the acceleration of white flight that had begun to take place.200 Dillin’s 
orders for this trial only affected those at schools near the tipping point; in order to 
desegregate the predominately black schools of the inner city, suburban schools would 
need to be brought into the process to fully desegregate IPS. The response to this ruling 
was best stated by Emma Lou Thornbrough: “The public response to the court’s decision 
was swift, highly emotional, and for the most part, ill-informed.”201  
 During the next School Board meeting in late August 1971, it was decided to file a 
preliminary plan for compliance with Dillin’s orders for the coming year. At a second 
meeting a few days later, the Board decided to instruct legal counsel to take all necessary 
steps to appeal the decision against the school system. This set IPS on a course of 
prolonged litigation that would consume energies and resources and create uncertainty 
and instability in the school system for the next ten years.202 Judge Dillin’s order only 
affected three percent of the total number of students in IPS and only one percent needed 
to be bused.203 The Board action to appeal shows how personally the Board members 
took the Judge’s decision and how adamantly they felt that IPS was not operating the 
school system in de jure segregation. If they could have put their personal feelings aside, 
it would have been obvious that more court hearings would not be able to fix hurt 
feelings but would have a devastating effect on the quality of education IPS was able to 
provide its students. After the next IPS School Board election, those voted into office 
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decided to take political retribution by firing Superintendent Stanley Campbell, who had 
agreed with Judge Dillin’s decision. This had the effect of making Campbell’s successor 
more of a politician than an educator according to Wade Mann of the Indianapolis 
News.204 
 In February of 1973, the three member Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
unanimously upheld the earlier ruling that IPS was guilty of de jure segregation. The 
appeals court did send back to Judge Dillin the part of his decision dealing with the State 
of Indiana maintaining segregation and whether the suburban school systems should be 
included in the desegregation of IPS. The next trial took place in June of 1973 and lasted 
into July. The central issue was to figure out a remedy for the de jure segregation IPS had 
been found guilty of in 1971. The added defendants were the State of Indiana, 
represented by Governor Otis Bowen, other state education officials, and twenty-two 
school corporations.205 It took two weeks for Judge Dillin to reach his decision. 
 He found the State of Indiana, certain state officials, as well as IPS, guilty of 
perpetuating de jure segregation and that a metropolitan plan must be the remedy to this 
situation. Judge Dillin noted Article VII of the State Constitution, which gives the 
Indiana General Assembly nearly unlimited power to regulate the school system and that 
employees of school corporations should undertake their duties not as employees of local 
units of self-government but as officers of the public school system.206 In Judge Dillin’s 
                                                          
204 Ibid., 317. 
205 Ibid., 327-328. 
206 Ibid., 335-336.  
102 
 
earlier decision, he cited the selection of sites for three high schools in Indianapolis as 
evidence of de jure segregation by IPS. Now he found the State and Board of Education 
and the Superintendent of Public Instruction had approved these actions, thereby 
contributing to de jure segregation within IPS.207 
 The added school corporations were not guilty of de jure segregation in education, 
but Judge Dillin found that desegregation could not be accomplished within the 
boundaries of IPS in a way that would work for any significant amount of time. 
Therefore, the Indiana General Assembly had the power and the duty to devise a 
metropolitan plan for the desegregation of IPS. If the legislature failed to act, the court 
would devise a plan. Since it was up to the General Assembly to come up with a plan for 
IPS, the ruling on the constitutionality of Unigov was unnecessary at the moment. An 
interim order was issued with the decision that called for the transportation of 
approximately 5,000 black students  from inner-city schools to eighteen surrounding 
school corporations and reassignments in the city schools so all schools would have at 
least a fifteen percent black student enrollment. IPS was to pay the cost of tuition and 
transportation of its students to the other school corporations. He could not order students 
from the suburbs into the inner city since IPS was the only school system found guilty of 
segregation.208 
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 Governor Bowen declared that IPS would get no leadership from the State House 
when he stated that “the state legislature was not the place to seek an answer to the school 
desegregation problems of Indianapolis…Desegregation was a local, not a state 
problem.” The president of the State Senate even voiced “resentment at the blame Judge 
Dillin placed on the General Assembly for not having coped with the desegregation 
problem.”  Mayor Lugar in January of 1974 stated it was clear that the American people, 
as a whole, were opposed to coercive transportation of students for racial balance in 
public schools and the issue of forced busing for racial balance was an issue on which 
both black and whites agreed. He promised as mayor to work to replace forced measures 
with voluntary ones. William Hudnut was working his re-election campaign for the U.S. 
House of Representatives during this time and according to the Indianapolis News was 
visible in his opposition to busing much more so than his challenger, Andy Jacobs Jr.209 
 In August 1974, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Dillin’s decision that 
Indiana State officials had by varying acts and omissions “promoted and inhibited 
desegregation within IPS, so the state as the agency in charge under Indiana law with the 
operation of the public school system, has an affirmative duty to assist the IPS School 
Board in desegregating IPS within its boundaries.” The court did overrule Dillin on the 
inclusion of school corporations from outside Marion County to use in his remedy. 
However, on the question of schools within the boundaries of Unigov, the appellate court 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the establishment of the 
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Unigov boundaries without similar establishment of IPS boundaries warranted an 
interdistrict remedy within Unigov.210 
 In 1974 the Indianapolis School Board was under court order from Judge Dillin to 
prepare a plan for the desegregation of Indianapolis schools. The School Board in direct 
defiance of the court order had a plan prepared but then did not approve it because “This 
board is opposed to the metropolitan plan of desegregation for the reasons that it will be 
disruptive to the community and violates Indiana law in that it requires the involuntary 
busing of children across legitimate governmental lines and this board has no legal right 
to order implementation thereof.”211 After the meeting school board member Fred 
Ratcliff told a reporter that the board had complied with the court order and if Judge 
Dillin, who was in the hospital at the time, wanted them to submit a plan, he would have 
to issue another court order. 
 Noted law school professor Charles Kelso observed that if local boards came up 
with workable plans, courts, including the Supreme Court, would probably uphold them. 
But, “so long as the Indianapolis School Board’s position remains as translucent 
opposition throughout the entire matter, the Supreme Court will be concerned about the 
efficiency of any plan the School Board might devise to achieve integration.”212 It must 
be noted that after the board’s non-action, Jessie Jacobs, the lone black board member, 
wrote to Judge Dillin. While asking if she could submit her own desegregation plan, she 
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stated “It seems to me that my fellow board members have always acted as if they had no 
obligation to move forward as public officers sworn to uphold the law and carry that law 
out until or unless they were finally commanded to do so someday in the future by at 
least the United States Supreme Court.”213 
 Before the next trial Circuit Court Judge John L. Niblack, former Indiana 
Legislator Dan Burton, State Senator Joan Gubbins, and State Representative Robert 
Bales announced that they were forming a committee to impeach Judge Dillin. Judge 
Niblack explained this was due to Dillin’s “unconstitutional, unlawful, and dictatorial 
conduct.” Burton stated there were a number of impeachable offenses but the main reason 
was that Dillin had removed elected officials from office and “tried to educate kids 
himself.” When Judge Niblack was asked by reporters why the committee was not 
seeking impeachment for the judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals who had 
upheld Dillin’s decision, Niblack responded “Because I didn’t choose to,” but did add 
that the appellate court was a “rotten court.”214 
 The decision to seek public impeachment hearings of Judge Dillin was considered 
so out of line by the Board of Managers of the Indianapolis Bar Association that they 
issued a public policy statement on the topic but did so without mentioning any names. 
The policy statement read that the Bar Association of Indiana did not approve of 
“personal attacks made upon judges and the resulting damage to our courts.” If a party 
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believed a decision to be erroneous, “the remedy lies in the orderly process of appeal, 
even to the Supreme Court of the United States, if need be, in efforts to reverse the 
decision by lawful and proper means…Personal disparagement of a judge because he has 
determined controlling law resulting in an unpopular decision in a given case, does 
disservice to our community and fundamental institutions.”215 
 The next trial took place in March 1975, and Mayor Lugar testified, citing the 
rejection of the 1959 Indiana School Consolidation Act in Marion County as the basis for 
his reasoning that Unigov would not have been passed if schools were involved in the 
plan for metropolitan government. Dillin gave his opinion on Unigov in August. He 
stated, “When the General Assembly expressly eliminated the schools from consideration 
under Unigov, it signaled its lack of concern with the whole problem and this inhibited 
desegregation within IPS.” The General Assembly, representing the state as a whole, 
should not have been “subservient to local pressures, and undoubtedly could have 
legislated a county-wide school system for Marion County as easily as legislating a 
county-wide civil government.”216 
Dillin also stated that the evidence presented to the court showed the outer 
townships and suburban governments, including the school corporations, “consistently 
resisted the movement of black citizens or black pupils into their territory.” They resisted 
annexation until it was clear schools would not be involved. He also noted other agencies, 
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including the Indianapolis Housing Authority, had perpetuated residential segregation in 
Marion County. He therefore ordered any new public housing from being built within the 
boundaries of IPS and prohibited the renovation of Lockefield Gardens as a public 
housing project.217 
 While Judge Dillin did have the best of intentions behind the housing order, it 
ended up hurting those it was trying to help. This order lasted for multiple years and hurt 
the ability of the city to develop housing for everyone downtown which was the area it 
was trying to revitalize. This order increased the income disparity and racial segregation 
that already existed in Marion County. The reasoning behind the order stemmed from the 
problem that all housing projects in Indianapolis at this time were located in IPS 
boundaries and that 98 percent of residents in public housing were black.218 Judge Dillin 
also cited that since IPS’s student population was now forty-two percent black, 
desegregation of the system was impossible unless a substantial number of black students 
were transferred to outside school corporations. With the desegregation orders expected 
to be in place for the 1975-1976 school year, recently elected Mayor Hudnut pledged his 
full support behind Judge Dillin’s orders.219 
 In January of 1976 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on Judge Dillin’s 
1975 decision. Justice Luther Swygert wrote the opinion. He found that in the Unigov 
Act and the repeal of the law which provided for the extension of school boundaries 
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when civil boundaries were extended indicated a legislative intent. The appeals court also 
upheld Dillin’s order that the Indianapolis Housing Authority should build no new family 
units in the IPS district. The court also indicated that Judge Dillin should retain 
jurisdiction in the case, suggesting that the district court monitor the transfer of students 
and to order any modifications if necessary. Four more years of litigation followed the 
court’s decision with no significant changes being made.220 
 The instability of IPS placed undue hardships on its students, staff, and faculty due 
to this drawn out litigation. In April of 1978 the IPS board approved the closing of seven 
schools due to the loss of students to be bused to the townships schools. However, when a 
stay was issued two weeks before school was to start in August, 300 school teachers were 
hired back by IPS for another year.221 What had been lost in the shuffle of segregation 
was the quality of education IPS provided to its students. According to noted Indianapolis 
historian Emma Lou Thornbrough, IPS in 1980 had a high rate of dropouts, suspensions, 
and expulsions among black students; problems were so bad that illiterate individuals 
were still allowed to graduate.222 
 The final plans for desegregation involved the busing of 5,583 IPS students, 
approximately five percent of IPS enrollment at this time, to six Marion County township 
schools (Lawrence, Warren, Perry, Decatur, Franklin, and Wayne). The total number of 
students assigned to each township was based on each township’s school population for 
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grades one through nine with the intended goal of a fifteen percent black population for 
each township. Students who were assigned to Lawrence, Warren, and Wayne townships 
schools were chosen due to their close proximity. This was not plausible for Franklin, 
Perry, and Decatur township schools. For these schools IPS looked at areas that had a 
high concentration of black students and were also near an interstate. This would cut 
down on bus stops and overall travel time for the students.223 In three years high schools 
would be desegregated as each new incoming freshman class would already be set up that 
way. Another 17,000 students were being bused within IPS and within a two year period 
500 teachers were laid off and ten elementary schools were closed.224 By the 1987-1988 
school year more than half of all IPS students would ride the bus to school.225  
 For the most part the desegregation of IPS went smoothly and without incident. 
Problems that were encountered included a disparity in the treatment of black and white 
students in disciplinary cases in the township schools. The Community Desegregation 
Advisory Council noted that the disparity in discipline between white and black students 
was so great that it was impossible to escape the recognition that some actions grew out 
of racial insensitivity. The other major problem was the high number of cases of black 
students being held back from promotion to the next grade.226 This was mostly attributed 
to the fact that IPS pupils had not had the opportunity to attend kindergarten and the low 
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quality of education that IPS provided the residents of the inner city. 1984 was the first 
year all grades, one thru twelve, were desegregated in the IPS system.227 
 The cost of desegregation was ordered by Judge Dillin to be paid for by the State 
of Indiana. From 1981 – 1985, IPS received more than $21 million from the state to 
upgrade schools, introduce new programs, and to reduce class sizes by hiring more 
teachers. When the state funding ended in 1985, IPS attempted to raise property taxes but 
was defeated at the polls by a well-financed group called the Indiana Taxpayers 
Association. This was not surprising since only twenty-seven percent of Center Township 
residents at the time had children who attended public schools, but what was surprising 
was that nearly eighty-five percent of eligible voters failed to vote.228 In 1987 the 
Indianapolis Star reported that township schools had received bonus money ranging from 
$1,238 to $2,134 per student over the actual cost to the township. The townships schools 
were able to use this money for such things as new books in the library and higher 
teaching salaries, which made it even harder for IPS to provide a quality education.229 
 Opposition by white voters from the outer townships of Marion County was 
clearly the reason that school systems were not included in Unigov. For years the outer 
township school corporations paid enormous fees to legal counsel in an attempt to avoid 
accepting a modest number of black students from the inner city, a policy which has left a 
legacy of resentment and suspicion in the black community of Indianapolis. Ironically, 
                                                          
227 Ibid., 498. 
228 Ibid., 517-518. 
229 Ibid., 518-519. 
111 
 
the township schools have benefited financially from desegregation and the transfer of 
black students. In retrospect, the remedy created by Judge Dillin appears to have been 
pragmatic and moderate but the prolonged opposition is difficult to understand. In June 
1998 a settlement was reached between IPS, suburban township schools, and government 
agencies approving an agreement that would phase out busing of inner city black students 
to township schools by 2017.230  
IPS Enrollment 
 IPS enrollment dropped from 100,000 in 1968, when the desegregation suit began, 
to approximately 47,000 in 1993. As of 1993, IPS spent $4,993 per pupil annually and 
had an overall budget of approximately $352 million.231 Overall, the busing added 
distance between where families lived and where their children were to be educated, by 
imposing additional rules and regulations upon administrators and teachers, and by 
placing racial balance ahead of parental choice of (and commitment to) schools. They 
unwittingly reduced educational opportunities for many students.232 The state and local 
governments have been unable to provide the students of IPS the same education that is 
provided to students throughout most of Indiana. This is largely due to the fact that IPS 
received little for its own desegregation needs such as the bussing within IPS, further 
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hurting its ability to keep up with technology needs and teacher pay, whereas the 
suburban schools districts were able to use their increased funds from the desegregation 
process to increase teacher pay as pointed out by James Adams in 1987 who was IPS 
superintendent.233 
 Recent graduation rates suggest that IPS is still struggling to prepare students for 
future success. Graduation rates for the 2012-13 school year were 68.3 percent, up from 
65.4 percent the previous school year. Of the 68.3 percent to graduate, nearly nine 
percent of those students needed a state waiver that exempts students from passing state 
tests to earn diplomas. IPS has the lowest graduation rate of all Marion County schools. 
Statewide graduation rates for both these school years was eighty-eight percent.234 IPS as 
of the 2013-14 school year had 30,813 students with eighty-three percent of the student 
body receiving free or reduced meals.235 IPS has had some bright spots with the use of 
magnet schools; one of its seven high schools was recognized by U.S News in its annual 
ranking of best high schools in the nation. Crispus Attucks, the medical magnet high 
school for students interested in a career in the medical field and formerly all black high 
school, was also ranked as the 34th best high school in the state.236 It must also be noted 
that in 2001 Indiana passed a charter school law which allowed local school boards, 
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public state universities, and the mayor of Indianapolis as eligible chartering 
authorities.237 This has hurt funding to the local school districts by reducing enrollment 
numbers. The performance of charter schools has been far from expected; as of 2014, half 
of the state's 76 charter schools are doing poorly or failing.238 
 The poor quality of education being offered by IPS hinders Indianapolis’ ability to 
attract jobs. In 1991, seven months after United Airlines (UAL) announcement that 
Indianapolis had won the bid to bring a new billion-dollar facility to maintain its 
expanding fleet of Boeing 737s, UAL officials revealed that the company was having 
difficulty persuading its current employees to move to Indianapolis because of the poor 
performance record of the city’s public schools. In comparing the finalists among the 
cities competing for the maintenance hub, UAL had discovered that Indianapolis was 
spending more money on elementary and secondary education but getting worse results 
than other places. According to a UAL official, this had been the biggest weakness in the 
city’s effort to obtain the project.239 
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Portland Public Schools 
 The Portland Public Schools (PPS) experience with desegregation was far 
different from what Indianapolis experienced. The black population of Portland only 
comprised two percent of the total city population by 1957 but eighty percent of the black 
population lived in the Albina district of Portland. This area is located in the northeastern 
part of the city. School desegregation was a major issue for PPS in the 1960s and 1970s. 
After the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision, PPS took the 
position that "it had a policy of equal education and that it would take no action regarding 
segregation in Portland Public Schools."240 However, after PPS sponsored a report to 
assess racial isolation and racial disparities in academic achievement, this report would 
be known as the Schwab Report. It took 18 months to complete and in 1964 concluded 
that racial disparity in education did exist and made over forty recommendations.241 
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Portland’s changing ethnicity from 1960-1990. 242 
  
Recommendations from the Schwab report included keeping the neighborhood 
school model, which did nothing to alleviate the problems caused by housing segregation, 
and advised against busing. In order to alleviate the schools segregation problem the 
Schwab Report recommended the voluntary Administrative Transfer Program (ATP), 
which allowed students to transfer to other schools provided there was room but required 
parents to bear the responsibility for transportation.243 The Schwab Report provided the 
following reasons for opposing busing: 
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We also fear the probable result of taking a small group of Negro children of 
deplorable home background out of an Albina school and isolating it in an all-white 
middle or upper class school where the Negro children may be two or three grade 
levels behind their new peers, and where they will be regarded as strangers, 
outsiders, subjected to ridicule and paternalism.244 
 
Members of the committee that wrote the Schwab Report believed that home life, 
education level, and social and cultural differences had the greatest impact on black 
students' educational experience, but they still assumed that most black Americans fell 
into the deprived category, citing socioeconomic factors as being more important than 
race in their opposition to busing. By rejecting busing for socioeconomic and cultural 
reasons, PPS avoided the issues of racial desegregation and busing entirely. The Portland 
NAACP branch condemned the Schwab Report based on several factors, including the 
emphasis on cultural deficiency and the failure to address desegregation.245 
 The Model Schools Program (MSP) was the major solution of the Schwab Report. 
Ten schools were selected for this program and its purpose was to provide compensatory 
education at the elementary level in order to improve academic achievement through 
smaller class sizes, classroom aides, and pre-schools.246 It is difficult to assess the success 
of the MSP because of the lack of a systematic and comprehensive evaluation process, 
but what is evident is that during the five years of its implementation, stability in critical 
areas was achieved. Academic achievement, for example, while not statistically 
significant, was rising; teacher turnover was reduced dramatically; and there were clear 
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indications that rates of disciplinary referrals and attendance problems dropped.247 The 
local black community however, was still upset with the quality of education being 
provided by the predominately black schools in the MSP. 
 By 1968, of the 4,800 black elementary pupils, 3,500 (seventy-three percent) were 
enrolled in nine of the ninety-four elementary schools and this pattern was repeated at the 
high school level.248 The assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. on Thursday, 
April 4, 1968 brought the issues of race to the forefront of PPS as Jefferson High School 
was closed on April 5th and 8th due to student unrest, but was reopened Tuesday April 9th. 
Racial tensions continued to grow and in 1969 there was a large riot on Union Avenue 
(today's Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard) that lasted four days.249 In the aftermath of 
the riot, Portland became more proactive in reducing the underlying causes of the riot. 
Desegregation of the PPS became a main focus. In the summer of 1969, PPS hired 
Superintendent Robert Blanchard, and he quickly changed the direction of PPS with 
regard to desegregation through his plan, "Portland Schools for the Seventies."250 
 The Schools for the Seventies program had a number of steps all aimed at 
desegregating the PPS. The school district was decentralized and reorganized into three 
administrative and attendance districts with new boundaries that effectively split the 
black population of Portland. This was partially done by creating a middle school system 
                                                          
247 Ibid, 21. 
248 Ibid, 23. 
249 Ibid, 25. 
250 Ibid, 26. 
118 
 
that would replace the previous kindergarten-through-eighth-grade configuration but 
specifically did not create a middle school for the Albina area. Early Childhood 
Education Centers (ECECs), however, would be established in the Albina area, which 
would theoretically encourage white Americans to send their children into a 
predominantly black neighborhood for schooling; busing was provided for children 
attending ECECs.251 
 This plan also called for an amendment to the Administrative Transfer Program 
(ATP); to include busing and recruitment of black students, the plan established a racial 
quota of 25 percent for minority students in schools. The redrawing of school boundaries 
was the easiest way for the school board to remain compliant with the Supreme Court's 
decisions and it also placed the greatest burden on the black population of Portland. By 
1975, approximately 22 percent (2,346) of Portland's total black student population was 
bused, compared to the 484 white students who participated in the ATP that same year.252 
Black students had difficulty adjusting to their new schools and teachers in the receiving 
schools were inadequately prepared to deal with the new students. The parents of ATP 
students were satisfied that busing was providing their children with a better education, 
and all of the parents interviewed said they would keep their children in the program.253 
 Jefferson High School, located in Northeast Portland, served as the city’s black 
high school and had a number of problems. Enrollment had steadily declined during the 
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1960s and 1970s, and in 1974, 1977, and 1980, the student body dipped below 1,000 total 
students. Converting Jefferson into an arts magnet school in 1974 had a marginal impact 
on increasing white student enrollment. Enrollment increased by approximately five 
hundred students in 1982 after two nearby schools were closed for low enrollment. The 
school's negative reputation began to fade until a gang-related shooting on the school's 
front steps in February 1988 once again painted it as a dangerous place, and enrollment 
declined. In the three years following the shooting, Jefferson lost over 400 students.254  
As of 2014, Jefferson High School was comprised of fifty percent black students 
and a total minority enrollment of seventy-six percent. With fewer than thirty percent of 
students in the surrounding area attending the school, enrollment dropped to 583 
students.255 In 2014, PPS had more than 48,500 students in eighty-one schools and was 
the largest school district in the Pacific Northwest.256 The district also had four high 
schools recognized by U.S News in its annual ranking of best high schools in the 
nation.257 Not all areas of Portland Public Schools are succeeding; as of 2014, PPS is only 
graduating seventy percent of its students and forty-two percent of the student body is on 
free or reduced lunch.258  
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PPS since the 1970s has enjoyed a more stable and successful learning 
environment compared to IPS. Portland has been able to graduate seventy percent of its 
students while IPS has yet to reach that mark. The 1969 federal segregation case caused 
instability within the Indianapolis Public School System and has hurt the quality of 
education IPS was able to provide its students before a desegregation plan was finally 
settled upon in 1981. The failures IPS have reflected poorly on the city and detracted 
businesses from relocating to its service area. 
Indianapolis Infant Mortality Rate 
 Indianapolis under Unigov also has a disappointing history of funding social 
services. In the early 1970s the City-County Council passed the Patterson Amendment, 
which stated that the local government need feel no obligation to pick up the shortfall if 
federal monies coming into the city were scaled back or discontinued. This amendment 
was aimed primarily at curtailing the funding of social service programs to alleviate 
human need. The amendment characterizes a common mindset in Indianapolis that social 
funds are bad. It was decisions like these that led Indianapolis to lead all major U.S. cities 
in the 1980s in the infant mortality rate, according to statistics released by the Children’s 
Defense Fund. This was measured by deaths before one year of age. The city was also 
experiencing a widening gap between white and black infant mortality rates. In 1986 and 
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1987 black infants born in Indianapolis were 2.5 times more likely to die before their first 
birthday than white infants.259 
 Mayor Hudnut did provide great leadership when this announcement was made. 
The city put together the Campaign for Healthy Babies, whose main goal was to reduce 
the number of newborns with low birth weight. A baby born weighing less than 3.5 
pounds is 200 times more likely to die than a larger baby. The biggest problem to 
overcome for this campaign was citizen apathy. A City-County Council member even 
said to Hudnut, “I don’t know why I should vote for any money for this campaign. It’s a 
problem for the black people downtown, not where I live.” Hudnut was able to counter 
this materialistic argument by the fact that it was in the economic self-interest of the 
suburban constituency to help decrease the incidence of low birth-weight babies who 
would have great difficulty surviving, because the fight to keep them alive cost more than 
good prenatal care. Hudnut liked to say, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
cure.” The average hospital cost of care for a very low birth-weight infant was 
approximately $70,000 at the time.260  
 In order to solve the infant mortality problem more education and better access to 
services was needed, but it also had to be paid for. Part of the funding came from the 
Ford Motor Company and March of Dimes to purchase a Maternity Outreach Vehicle 
that would travel to city neighborhoods providing information and health care. Four 
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comprehensive medical teams began working in six service locations, and by 1991 these 
teams served more than twenty percent of the highest-risk mothers in the city. These 
efforts achieved mixed results. The statistics began decreasing faster than those in other 
large cities, but they still remained too high for Mayor Hudnut. By the end of 1991 
Indianapolis had dropped from first to eleventh in infant-mortality rates among all major 
U.S. cities. The white infant mortality rate fell from 9.9 to 6.9 percent, while the black 
rate increased from 18.9 to 20.7 percent. By October of 1993 the black rate had decreased 
to 11.2 percent, but again that was incredibly high.261 While these numbers do show that 
improvement was being made, it also shows how much work was still left to be done 
when it came to helping the citizens of the inner city. Infant mortality rates recently 
reported by the Indianapolis Star stated that Marion County had a high of 12.9 percent in 
2009 and that year the black rate shot past 20 to 21.4 percent.262  
Unigov Tax Structure 
 A major reason that social services and IPS have had to deal with so many more 
challenges than other cities has to do with the city’s tax structure. The principal local tax 
in Marion County is the property tax. Even though one set of property assessment rules 
apply throughout the county, the 1992 notice of property tax rates in Marion County, 
published by the county auditor and treasurer presented a 3,840 cell matrix of property 
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tax rates for Unigov. These rates varied from a low of $7.92 per $100 assessed valuation 
in parts of Washington Township to a high of $13.09 per $100 assessed valuation in part 
of Center Township.263 The difference in taxing has to do with the philosophy of the city, 
which has been to match the scale of taxation with the scale of benefits received by an 
area. This has led to the proliferation of different tax rates and taxing units within the 
county as each new program of the consolidated city is funded by a special taxing district. 
With this philosophy, Center Township pays the highest property taxes because the 
residents are forced to pay for all county and municipal services.264 It was argued when 
Unigov was passed that consolidation would have a redistributive impact by making the 
suburban property tax available for central services, but this has yet to happen.  
 Center Township is home to more than one-half of all tax-exempt or deferred 
property in the county. In 1992 these tax incentives for economic development cost 
Center Township $18 million. This abatement contributed to Center Township’s higher 
property tax rate. For the residents of Center Township, it seems that the abatements 
created employment and entertainment for suburban residents but was paid for by the 
increase in non-abated properties in the rest of the Township.265 The number of taxing 
units in Marion County has increased under Unigov to around one hundred different 
units.266 
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Indianapolis Area Population Changes 
Population of Indianapolis, Marion County and the MSA from the U.S. Census.267 
Many of the problems facing Center Township also have to do with white flight to 
the suburban townships and the outlying counties. In 1970, Center Township had a 
population of 273,598, but by 1990 it was down to 182,140, which is a loss of thirty-four 
percent of the population in a twenty-year span. The greatest loss for Center Township 
has been that of local leadership which was already seen in the schools but also in the 
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local neighborhood associations. With the many problems facing Center Township, it has 
made it next to impossible to attract families back from the suburban townships and 
outlying counties. The historical precedence for this can be seen in the recent efforts to 
revitalize the Renaissance Place neighborhood.  
 Renaissance Place development lies a half mile north of downtown, and takes on a 
pitcher shape. The northern boundary is Interstate 65 and Central Avenue and continues 
south to encompass Central Avenue where it splits into East Street and Fort Wayne 
Avenue. East Street becomes the eastern boundary and that continues south until Walnut 
Street. Walnut Street creates the southern boundary until it dead-ends at Alabama Street, 
which creates part of the western boundary. Fort Wayne Avenue runs at an angle and 
creates the pitcher shape for the Renaissance Place neighborhood.  
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Renaissance Place 
Renaissance Place neighborhood outlined.268 
In 1959 all the housing in the neighborhood was leveled as part of a failed urban 
renewal program. Three high-rise luxury apartment buildings were built, and fifteen more 
had been planned but never materialized due to the high vacancy rate at the first three 
buildings. The land would sit empty for two decades until nearby neighborhoods became 
historic districts, which helped to raise the value of the land.  
In 1981 a developer got permission to build thirty nearly identical two-story, four 
unit buildings on the eleven-acre site.269 Each unit had an attached garage, driveway, 
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lawn, privacy fence, and ranch-style design. The city sold the land to the developer for 
$22,000, even though it was bought by the city for $62,500; neither valuation is even 
close to the 1959 assessed value of $570,490.270 There was also a ten-year tax abatement 
for property owners that added to the financial appeal of the units. The project was unable 
to offer any subsidized public housing due to the 1975 federal court order by Judge Dillin 
that prevented any more public housing being built in IPS.271 This greatly limited the 
demographic appeal of the project. 
 Renaissance Place was able to draw a number of middle class suburbanites back to 
the city but it was limited to couples with adult children, adults living alone, same sex 
roommates, and other households without a nuclear family. Every unit was sold and the 
residents added to the area’s buying power along with improving the physical appearance 
of the area. Local tax revenue from the project would be limited for the first decade and 
increased by as much as seventy-five percent after ten-year tax abatements ran out. It 
should also be noted that thirty-eight percent of the Renaissance Place units were rented 
out by their owners.272 Nearly all the households were void of dependent children and 
attracted many single homeowners because these units were smaller than the neighboring 
houses in the nearby historic neighborhoods. By spring of 1983 half of the units were 
owned by absentee landlords and half of these units were vacant, which meant the 
neighborhood had the possibility of experiencing a rapid turnover in residents. Long-term 
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residential stability is considered to be a safeguard against neighborhood deterioration in 
the downtown area.273  
Renaissance Place was successful in turning an empty lot into a viable 
neighborhood but was not a viable option to draw suburban residents with children back 
to Center Township. As Aaron M. Renn, a leading urban analyst states, “suburbs today 
not only have better schools and safer streets than the central city, they feature fully 
professional fire departments, large park acreage, lavishly landscaped parkways 
exceeding city standards, and even better snow removal.”274 These public services are 
also able to be offered at a cheaper price than the city can provide because there is less of 
an existing tax burden in suburban locations.  
 Another disappointing side effect of Unigov has been to turn the Marion County 
Republican Party into a modern day political machine. Unigov raised the number of 
registered voters who could participate in the election of mayor and city-county council 
from 239,371 to 406,155, with 85,000 of these newcomers registered as Republicans and 
80,000 more who voted Republican but had not voted in the 1968 Republican primary. 
This changed Indianapolis; pre-Unigov had a history of close mayoral elections but 
Indianapolis became dominated by the Republican Party in city-county elections for the 
first twenty years after the passage of Unigov.275  
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Voter turnout for the first two elections under Unigov brought an increase in voter 
turnout. The 1975 election was Hudnut’s first; he received his greatest challenge from 
Robert Welch, a local businessman. Welch’s mayoral loss signaled to the Democrats that 
they could not win under the Unigov format. In the 1979 election Hudnut received nearly 
the same number of votes as he did in 1975 but this time there were 60,000 fewer people 
voting. No Democratic mayoral challenger in the next three elections against Hudnut was 
able to received even seventy-five percent of the vote that Welch received in 1975. 
Unigov has allowed the Republican Party to dominate Indianapolis government and has 
diminished participation of Democratic voters who mainly come from the center city.276   
Racial Consequences of Unigov 
 Black residents of Center Township have felt some of the most negative aspects of 
Unigov. In 1960, blacks constituted twenty-seven percent (130,000 people) of 
Indianapolis’ population and with white flight it was expected to be between thirty 
percent and forty percent by 1970. With the passage of Unigov, the black presence in the 
city fell to eighteen percent and black political strength reverted back to what it had been 
in 1945. While Unigov has increased the number of black representatives on the City-
County Council compared to the pre-Unigov system, this has not transferred into 
increased influence as most blacks are Democrats in a system that routinely creates 
Republican majorities.  
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After Unigov, black residents only held a minority status inside a minority party 
that was unable to win a mayoral race or a majority on the City-County Council for the 
next twenty years.277 But the most telling legacy of Unigov on the black community is 
that there were no black members involved in the planning of Unigov, nor were any black 
politicians or community leaders needed to pass this piece of legislation. Instead of 
helping to unite a community, Unigov has had the effect of creating an even larger gulf 
between the black and white communities of Indianapolis.278 
Indianapolis and its changing ethnicity over the years.279 
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Mayor Hudnut also continued the tradition of the RAC in allowing unelected 
officials major access and input into the city plans of Indianapolis. The City Committee 
was an unofficial, self-selected group that worked behind the scenes in the 1970s and 
1980s to advance the city’s downtown plans. This committee has been widely 
acknowledged but was never publicized and consisted of approximately thirty men with 
only State Representative William A. Crawford being the only minority member. This 
small group of young businessmen, lawyers, bankers, and civic leaders met privately to 
discuss the city’s development plans. The committee appears to have disbanded 
sometime before the 1991 election.280 
The Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee also works in this same manner of 
having non-elected officials helping craft government policies. The GIPC is a private, 
not-for-profit, non-partisan civic improvement organization funded by foundation grants 
and private contributions. It was created under Mayor Barton in 1964. It functions as an 
advisory arm of the Mayor’s office and has its roots as an elitist organization. Mayor 
Hudnut attempted to change this by inviting local leaders from neighborhoods, organized 
labor, the League of Women Voters, and the Jaycees, but business and other professional 
leaders were still more numerous. This has always given the GIPC a top-down view and 
the organization has often been faulted for being an unelected “showdown government.” 
It is an institution that has had tremendous influence on the city’s agenda but is 
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accountable to neither the electorate nor their representatives on the City-County 
Council.281    
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Chapter 3 Outside Funding 
Lilly Endowment 
 Indianapolis and Unigov have been extremely lucky to have had the support of the 
Lilly Endowment. The Lilly Endowment was created in 1937 by three members of the 
Lilly family (J.K. Lilly Sr. and his two sons, J.K., Jr. and Eli) through gifts of stock in 
their pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly and Company. A change to the tax code in the 
1969 Tax Reform Act forced the Endowment to diversify its stock holdings and to 
increase its grant pay-outs. All foundations are required to pay out either five percent of 
their assets or income, whichever is greater; due to this, the Endowment's giving rose 
from about "$9 million in the late 1960s to over $50 million by the mid-1970s."282  
In 1972 Eli Lilly, the endowment’s co-founder, began helping Indianapolis with 
larger and much more concrete efforts than ever before. He personally met with Mayor 
Lugar in 1972 to discuss the poor condition of downtown, and three days later Lilly told 
Lugar that the endowment would renovate the City Market. A few months later a member 
of Lugar’s staff, James T. Morris, was hired by the endowment to administer Indianapolis 
projects.283 
 Between 1975 and 1987 the endowment invested $300 million in the city. It 
became a major partner in public and private ventures to help rebuild the city. The Lilly 
Endowment contributed $25 million to the Indiana Convention Center expansion that 
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included the Hoosier Dome. It supported the restoration of the Central Canal, the Indiana 
Theatre, and the Circle Theatre (located on Monument Circle and since the 1980s home 
of the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra), and also made substantial grants to build the 
new Indianapolis Zoo, the Eiteljorg Museum of the American Indian and Western Art, 
the sports complex on the IUPUI campus, the Major Taylor Velodrome, and the Walker 
Building. By 1991 Indianapolis and Indiana recipients had received more than $1 billion 
from the endowment. In the early 1990s the Lilly Endowment refocused its attention on 
human needs and more state-wide initiatives.284 The Lilly Endowment is unique to 
Indianapolis and has greatly helped the economic development of the city. 
Krannert Charitable Trust 
 Another charity that greatly helped the economic development of the city was the 
Krannert Charitable Trust. It was established in 1960 by a million-dollar gift from 
Herman and Ellnora Krannert of Indianapolis. The aim of the trust was to fund major 
projects that would create “Centers of Excellence” in the fields of education, medicine, 
youth services, and performing arts. The trust was also created in such a way that it was 
to dissolve within 15 years after the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Krannert; he died in 1972 and 
she died in 1974. The final grant was given in 1987, but during its twenty-seven years the 
trust received $62 million from the Krannerts and paid out $200 million in grants. The 
trust help fund a local YMCA, the Children’s Museum, the Hoosier Dome, the Pan 
American Plaza, University Place Conference Center at IUPUI, and the Indiana 
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Theatre.285 The Krannert Charitable Trust was an unexpected contribution in helping 
revitalize Indianapolis. 
Federal Funds 
 Perhaps the most unexpected change to come from Unigov was the ability of 
Indianapolis to secure federal funding. In the seven years prior to consolidation, 
Indianapolis had never received more than $7 million dollars from the federal 
government in one year, and averaged under $4 million per year. In the first year after 
consolidation, federal funding increased five-fold, doubled again in 1972, and topped 
$100 million dollars every year from 1973 to1990, peaking at over $300 million in 1981. 
Federal spending in Indianapolis became a substantial portion of the city’s revenue from 
1972 through 1990, averaging more than 15 percent of the city’s budget. From 1978 
through 1981, federal dollars supported more than twenty percent of the city’s total 
expenditures. A big portion of the increased federal spending in Indianapolis came via the 
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which brought more than $500 million to 
Indianapolis from 1974 to 1987. By 1990, federal expenditures leveled off at $50-$100 
million annually.286 
 There are three main reasons why this amount of federal funding was unexpected. 
First, the population of Indianapolis increased by including areas of Marion County. 
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Second, Mayors Lugar and Hudnut explicitly lobbied for federal dollars over six 
consecutive mayoral terms, in contrast to previous mayors. And lastly, Republican 
Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan supported the largest city in 
the country governed by fellow Republicans. Due to Mayor Lugar’s close relationship 
with President Nixon, Indianapolis gained special treatment and significant federal 
investment in the early 1970s, serving as “an urban laboratory in which to test new 
approaches to coping with the problems of cities.”287 None of these things could have 
been planned for, but Indianapolis was in a unique situation to take advantage of these 
fortuitous circumstances. 
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Conclusion 
 Indianapolis under the rule of Unigov has turned out to be a new city built on old 
problems. Continual expansion must be counteracted because this type of growth is 
unsustainable. Portland has proven to be a leader in how a city can use planning to build a 
sustainable center city. That in no way diminishes the accomplishments of Unigov but it 
does recognize that more must be done. Unigov was something that had never been tried 
before in Indiana politics and has provided Indianapolis with more resources to solve 
many of the same problems it had in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 With the I-465 belt road around Indianapolis, suburban development away from 
the inner city is taking place at greater distances than ever before. Portland has refused to 
build a ring road because it would be counterproductive to its compact city model. 
Instead of the nine townships of Marion County as the Metropolitan Statistical Area, now 
it consists of Marion County and the eight surrounding counties. The provision in Unigov 
that does not allow for it to extend past the borders of Marion County is no longer a 
viable option. Indianapolis needs a regional government like the Metro government that 
governs Portland. More sustainable city and state planning is needed to reduce the 
incredible distance the metropolitan area now spans.  
 Since Unigov is unable to expand past the Marion County line, it is unable to 
capture the growth of the suburbs as it did in 1970. These suburbs outside of Marion 
County have also grown considerably since 1970 and now directly compete with 
Indianapolis for jobs and economic growth. According to a 2013 “job sprawl” report by 
138 
 
the Brookings Institute, Indianapolis had one of the largest increases in the past decade of 
jobs moving farther away from downtown.288 The number of jobs located ten to thirty-
five miles from the central business district rose to forty percent in the metro area in 
2010. In 2000 it had been thirty-three percent of jobs in the metro area; this was the 
eighth largest increase among the one hundred largest metro areas in the United States.289 
 Mayors Lugar and Hudnut were very successful at building a downtown that 
attracted middle-class society back for a number of reasons. After all the improvements 
to the downtown, it has still been unable to attract traditional families from the 
surrounding suburbs. Harrison Ullmann, a local Indianapolis journalist, points out that 
Carmel and the rest of the Hamilton County suburbs are now competing with 
Indianapolis for access to middle-class society. He even refers to a mid-1990s Unigov 
study that showed more people were commuting from suburb to suburb than from suburb 
to the city for work.290 Indianapolis is starting to become more isolated from middle-class 
society. This can be overcome by focusing on the residents of Indianapolis and improving 
their quality of life.  
John L. Krauss, director of the Indiana University Public Policy Institute, noted 
that restaurants, department stores, automobile service centers, and other businesses have 
followed the growing populations in Hamilton and Hendricks counties and other areas 
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bordering Indianapolis.291 This trend continues on; in 2010 Indianapolis was below 
average in the share of jobs within three miles of downtown but had a greater than 
average share of jobs in the middle ring, three to ten miles from the city center. The 
report concluded that the recession slowed the shift of jobs from the business core from 
2007 to 2010, in part due to the suburban-led housing market collapse.292 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Statistical Area Map 
The nine county metropolitan statistical area of Indianapolis. 293 
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Indiana. April 18, 2013. Accessed November 23, 2014. http://www.hcalliance.com/About-
Us/Newsroom/Indianapolis-among-U-S--metro-areas-with-largest-j.aspx.  
292 Ibid. 
293 "Journey to Work Profiles for Large Metropolitan Areas." - Journey To Work. Accessed December 15, 
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 Hamilton County is the clear leader in suburban development. This can best be 
seen in a recent 2014 article by John Tuohy of the Indianapolis Star that outlined the 
largest mayoral salaries in the state. The towns of Carmel, Westfield, Noblesville, and 
Fishers, which is in the process of incorporation, are all able to provide greater financial 
support to their respective mayors than Indianapolis is to its own mayor, even though it is 
the largest city in the state.294 Suburban sprawl is a major problem for the nation and the 
Indianapolis metro area. Unigov has been unable to stop suburban sprawl from the outer 
Marion County townships to the adjacent counties. Unigov was designed to manage the 
city but now the metropolitan area needs leadership to emerge and start solving these 
larger problems. 
 American geographer D.W. Meinig, demonstrates that this has been happening 
going as far back as 1890, when an editor in the September issue of Scribner's Magazine 
noted that cities are at the mercy of business. Any business needing labor can have its 
choice nowadays from a long list of cities which will give it a site for a factory, pay the 
expenses of moving, and also potentially give towards the construction of a new 
building.295 The system of “economic incentives” (corporate welfare) wastes public 
dollars, subsidizes shareholders, fosters unfair competition, and diverts policy makers 
                                                          
2014. https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census_issues/ctpp/data_products/journey_to_work/jtw8.cfm. 
294 John Tuohy, "Who Are Indiana's Highest Paid Mayors?" Indy Star, November 11, 2014. Accessed 
November 23, 2014. http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2014/10/27/indianas-highest-paid-
mayors/17769963/. 
295 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol. 1: 
Atlantic America, 1492-1800. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 284-286. 
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from making long-term improvements in their communities such as schools, medical 
care, cultural institutions, and general infrastructure. 
 Aaron M. Renn, a leading urban analyst, details how people are now doing this as 
well. Suburbs are able to offer an updated city built with current market trends, and 
without legacy expenditures from past boondoggles, political dynasties, deferred 
infrastructure development, and fewer low income residents. Eventually, the area fills up 
and the growth comes to a halt. All these positives end up working in reverse as a cycle 
of decline emerges that will ultimately cause major problems in vast tracts of suburban 
America that aren’t either wealthy communities or in markets that have tight restrictions 
on new buildings. The old outer suburbs of Marion County are currently facing this 
problem as they have fallen out of favor and become zones of suburban blight. With this 
system, all the liabilities and costs are attached to a territory that allows for those who can 
to move, continuing the cycle of unsustainable growth.296 
With a capitalistic system like the one just described, planning becomes 
imperative for the sustainable success of a city. The key example that Portland and the 
state of Oregon have set is the need for a state’s largest city to work together with the 
metropolitan and state government. Portland has been the showcase for the people of 
Oregon to demonstrate that working together can do more than people working 
individually. An active and involved citizenry is needed as well as leadership that is 
                                                          
296 Aaron Renn. "The Urbanophile » When Sprawl Hits the Wall." The Urbanophile. May 22, 2014. 
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willing to compromise in order to promote sustainable growth for everyone to be able to 
enjoy. 
For Indianapolis to compete with Portland or even Carmel, there has to be better 
pull factors to draw traditional families back to the city. If the city becomes a better place 
to live and work, others will take notice. The biggest hindrance to creating sustainable 
growth and attracting the traditional family back to the city is the unequal education 
offered by the eleven public schools systems serving Indianapolis. By improving the 
school system, it will improve race relations as many failing schools are located in 
predominately black neighborhoods. It will also increase Indianapolis’ ability to attract 
businesses back to the center city because these workers will have the skills that are 
needed.  
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